

Environmental Law and Growing Up

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Typical of many Yale law students of the late 1960s, I wanted to lead the way to “progressive” social goals. My friends and I had learned from Professor Guido Calabresi that reaching these goals required making difficult choices such as between preventing accidents and keeping down the cost of their prevention,¹ or, more to the present point, between protecting the environment and keeping down the cost of its protection. We also knew who ought to make these choices for society—us.

We wanted power to change the world and thought little about its legitimacy. We were impatient with professors, such as Alexander Bickel and Robert Bork, who questioned the legitimacy of judicial policymaking and who argued that those who disagree with political decisions should resort to political, not judicial procedures.² For us, their procedural concerns were excuses to oppose progress: our goals justified the means. To gain such power, I joined some law school friends who had founded the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).³ We saw ourselves as “private attorneys general”—able to wield the governmental power that political officials failed, in our opinion, to use properly.

Litigation gave us real power, at least initially. It was a heady thing, at barely thirty years of age, to be litigating cases that had a major impact on the shape of environmental law and also sometimes forced industries to spend billions of dollars, frustrated

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1. See generally G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, *TRAGIC CHOICES* (1978); G. CALABRESI, *THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS* (1970).

2. These views were reflected in their writings. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, *THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS* (1986); Bork, *Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems*, 47 *IND. L.J.* 1 (1971).

3. NRDC's founding members were from two distinct groups. The first group consisted of Yale law graduates who were interested in creating a nonprofit public interest law firm. The second group was comprised of New York “establishment” lawyers and conservationists who were opposed to the construction of a pumped-storage power plant at Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River. Both groups sought funding from the Ford Foundation which suggested that they combine their efforts. The groups adopted the Ford Foundation suggestion and NRDC was incorporated in December, 1969. See Adams, *Responsible Militancy-The Anatomy of a Public Interest Law Firm*, 29 *REC. A.B. CITY N.Y.* 631, 633 (1974).

cabinet-level decisions, or were covered on network news.⁴ NRDC was able to exercise substantial power at this time because public demand for environmental protection had reached a fever pitch just when public confidence in government had waned. The war in Vietnam and the machinations of Presidents Johnson and Nixon critically damaged the public's confidence in government. This distrust of government gave rise to legislation which transformed legal institutions in ways that enabled us to become private attorneys general.

We obtained what we thought we needed to achieve our goals, but we failed to foresee the pitfalls lurking in the newly modified legal institutions that provided us with that power. These institutions were too good to be true, but I was too young and hopeful to know that. Part I of this comment uses the history of air pollution control to describe the changes that occurred in legal institutions. Part II argues that in establishing the current legal institutions—through the passage of the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act⁵—Congress played the demagogue rather than honorably discharging its responsibilities to make difficult choices. This Comment concludes with a discussion of how these changes in legal institutions affected the role of public interest lawyers.

I. Changing Legal Institutions

Changes in the law concerning air pollution provide a stark example of the transformation of legal institutions in which public interest lawyers gained new power. The common law treated air pollution as a nuisance.⁶ The measure of acceptable nuisance was custom, and custom balanced the desire for clean air against the need to emit pollution for almost any industrial or even domestic activity.⁷ However, since the common law could not handle many

4. See, e.g., *Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n*, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (development of fast breeder nuclear reactors requires programmatic environmental impact statement); *NRDC v. EPA*, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Clean Air Act requires plans to control land use and transportation); *NRDC v. EPA*, No. 72-2233 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 1973) (EPA must decide whether to regulate lead in gasoline).

5. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)).

6. See *RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS* § 821A (1979); *PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS* § 86 (1984).

7. See *W. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER* 47-48 (1986).

air pollution conflicts,⁸ legislatures responded by enacting specific rules of conduct.⁹ Like the common law, these legislated rules reflected a balance, albeit struck on a political scale, between the concerns of both polluter and victim.

Legislatures began to delegate substantial rulemaking authority to administrative agencies. This shift away from legislative rulemaking was most dramatic during the 1930s. At that time, many scholars questioned the public's ability to elect legislatures on a well-informed, rational basis without being unduly influenced by special interests, like the polluting industries.¹⁰ The public interest would seemingly get a fairer shake in a nonpolitical arena, such as an expert administrative agency. Therefore, when air pollution became a federal concern in the early 1960s, it seemed natural for Congress to give federal agencies and the states broad discretion to design the rules of conduct.¹¹ Such legislation, in essence, gave federal administrators and state officials the power to balance the interests of polluters and the victims of pollution as other institutions had balanced them in previous legal regimes.

Administrative agencies and states operating under broad statutory delegations gradually began to promulgate rules to reduce air pollution. These steps, however, were too little, too late to calm mounting public anxiety over pollution.¹² As Ralph Nader wrote, "The deep loss of popular belief that government is capable of protecting and advancing the public interest against this airborne epidemic and its corporate sources reflects a broader absence of confidence."¹³ There was widespread distrust of administrative agencies, which had turned out to be not quite so

8. See generally R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 198-324 (1978) (common law rules failed because of lack of applicable custom or high transactions costs).

9. These statutes go back centuries. For example, Edward I enacted a smoke abatement law as early as 1273. See Chass & Feldman, *Tears for John Doe*, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 349, 352 (1954).

10. See generally E. PURCELL, THE CRISES OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 95-114 (1973) (academic scholarship of 1920s and 1930s argued that electorate could not deal with public issues wisely).

11. See Schoenbrod, *Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act*, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 740, 744-45 (1983).

12. *Id.*

13. See RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION, VANISHING AIR vii (1970) (foreword by Ralph Nader) (hereinafter NADER REPORT).

expert, highly political, and vulnerable to lobbying from regulated industries.¹⁴

Public distrust of agencies put heat on Congress to make the hard choices.¹⁵ Ralph Nader pinned the blame on Senator Muskie who could not ignore the criticism because he had based his presidential ambitions partly on his image as a guardian of the environment.¹⁶ Congress responded to demands that it make the hard choices by passing the Clean Air Act of 1970. Senator Muskie, one of the major architects of the legislation, promised that it would mean that "all Americans in all parts of the country shall have clean air to breathe within the 1970s."¹⁷ He claimed that, instead of passing the buck, the Act that he authored had made the "hard choices."¹⁸ The choices that Congress claimed it made in 1970 to fulfill its promise of healthy air¹⁹ included a mandate that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "shall" decide how clean the air needs to be to protect health by setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),²⁰ that to meet this goal by 1977 the states "shall" adopt plans that place the necessary limits on emissions of air pollution,²¹ and that, should a state fail to adopt such a plan, EPA "shall" impose one on that state.²² If any "shall" goes undone, or if any source violates an emission limit, then at the behest of any citizen a federal district judge "shall" require compliance with the Act.²³ Congress enacted this statute unanimously²⁴ partly because it promised healthy air without forcing legislators to decide an issue that had no popular

14. See Ackerman & Hassler, *Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act*, 89 *YALE L.J.* 1466, 1474-79 (1980) (discussing perception that New Deal paradigm had not worked as intended and was inadequate to deal with air pollution problem).

15. See generally Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, *Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law*, 1 *J.L. ECON. & ORG.* 313 (1985) (describing the political origins of federal environmental legislation).

16. See *NADER REPORT*, *supra* note 13.

17. 116 *CONG. REC.* 42,381 (1970).

18. *Id.*

19. For a detailed discussion, see Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 756-62.

20. 42 *U.S.C.* § 7409(b)(1) (1982).

21. *Id.* §§ 7410(a),(c) (1982). See generally Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 756-59.

22. 42 *U.S.C.* § 7410(c) (1982).

23. *Id.* § 7604 (1982).

24. The House of Representatives approved H.R. 17255 on June 10, 1970, by a vote of 375 to 1. 116 *CONG. REC.* 19,244 (1970). The Senate passed H.R. 17255 with a Senate amendment on September 17, 1970, by a vote of 73 to 0. 116 *CONG. REC.* 32,371 (1970). The Conference Report was approved on December 18, 1970 by a unanimous vote both in the House, 116 *CONG. REC.* 42,524 (1970), and in the Senate, 116 *CONG. REC.* 42,395 (1970).

solution: how to allocate the costly burden of reducing emissions.²⁵ Instead, Congress chose to delegate this issue. In contrast, in dealing with automobiles, Congress did make the difficult choices in setting emission limits on new cars,²⁶ but it delegated the decision on emission limits for stationary sources.²⁷

II. The Clean Air Act as a Fraud

Putting the automobile emission limits aside, the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act (Act) worked like a chain letter:²⁸ the public paid the authors of the Act political tribute for its passage, but the public was left waiting for a payoff promised to come from those lower down the chain of delegation.²⁹ EPA did establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards for some air pollutants³⁰ and most states did begin to adopt cleanup plans for some pollutants.³¹ But states balked as they began to realize that promulgation of emission limits sufficient to meet federal health standards meant higher electricity rates, layoffs in some sectors, a price advantage for imports, and controls on the voters' use of their cars.³² The states' refusal to adopt plans put the legal onus on EPA to impose plans on the states with air pollution controls adequate to achieve its National Ambient Air Quality Standards.³³

During the early 1970s, this statutory scheme helped public interest environmental litigation groups such as NRDC win in courtrooms.³⁴ The citizen suit provision of the Act³⁵ allowed private attorneys general to sue EPA for failure to perform any of its mandatory duties to protect public health by implementing sufficient emission controls on industry and to sue industry for failure to obey these emission controls. There were bound to be

25. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 765-66.

26. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (1982).

27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7545 (1982).

28. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)).

29. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 766-77.

30. National Primary and Secondary Air Quality Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187 (1971) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1972)).

31. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 763, 777.

32. *Id.* at 770-71.

33. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1982).

34. See, e.g., NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (EPA required to list lead as pollutant requiring NAAQS).

35. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).

many implementation failures³⁶ because the Act, unlike the common law and earlier statutes, made no allowance for balancing health protection against other concerns, even though such balancing is inevitable.³⁷ The 1970 Act failed to grapple with the reality that balancing would be just as inevitable after 1977 as it was before.

Indeed there were far more opportunities for winning law suits than NRDC could possibly bring. We had the prerogative to decide what suits to bring, and thereby to determine, in part, how EPA, state, and industry resources would be deployed to address the pollution problem. In my opinion, NRDC helped to advance the social goals which we considered important. What concerns me now is not how NRDC played its role, but the efficacy and legitimacy of the legal institutions in which its role was played.

A. *Delegation: A Poor Means to a Worthwhile End*

Congressional delegation was probably not the most effective way to achieve the goal of a cleaner environment. Although early advocates of delegation thought agencies were insulated from the political fray, subsequent experience showed that Congress and the White House had real power to influence how EPA exercised its delegated authority.³⁸ Bowing to that pressure, EPA learned how to play the game in a way that made the going much tougher for public interest groups that were trying to enforce the statutory mandate. EPA could avoid difficult decisions for several years just by drawing out the process of litigation.³⁹ When courts

36. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 766-77 (catalog of breakdowns in EPA's implementation of Clean Air Act).

37. Under the 1970 Act, economic and technological feasibility do not excuse harm to health except in the transitory sense that a limited amount of time is allowed to perform each of the mandatory duties on the road to complete health protection. See, e.g., *Train v. NRDC*, 421 U.S. 60, 64-67 (1975).

38. For example, the White House can fire EPA's leaders, while Congress can cut its budget and harass its officials through hearings, subpoenas, investigations, and letters of inquiry. These pressures make it difficult for an aggressive EPA to impose tough plans on states and industry. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 769-75; LASH, SEASON OF SPOILS (1984) (chronicling White House interference with EPA and Department of Interior in early Reagan years.)

39. The NRDC complaint designed to force EPA to promulgate ambient air standards for lead was filed on March 2, 1974. See *NRDC v. Train*, 411 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court of appeals upheld the order compelling EPA to establish a standard for lead in 1976. See *NRDC v. Train*, 545 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1976). EPA's ambient air standard for lead was finally approved on appeal. See *Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA*, 647 F.2d

finally did order the Agency to act, EPA tried to avoid imposing controversial emission limits by approving state plans that it knew were insufficient to meet health goals,⁴⁰ tampering with the goals to make them less stringent,⁴¹ and failing to establish any National Ambient Air Quality Standards for some pollutants known to be dangerous.⁴² Showing a reviewing court that EPA had doctored its numbers, was much tougher than proving that EPA had missed a deadline.⁴³

Throughout this period, the same legislators that had reaped political credit, sometimes with our help, for protecting the environment by enacting the legislation, were urging EPA to go easy and thus getting more political credit and campaign contributions from constituents threatened with emission controls. For example, the New York City congressional delegation, which generally prides itself on its environmental sensitivity, was quick to oppose environmental regulations that would cost their constituents. In *Friends of the Earth v. Carey*,⁴⁴ NRDC obtained a court order against the Governor of New York State and the Mayor of New York City to force them to implement a plan that placed tolls on the Harlem and East River Bridges to raise funds to improve mass transit as an alternative to the automobile.⁴⁵ The entire city congressional delegation called for an amendment to the Act in order to circumvent a possible court order, with two interesting exceptions. Congressman Ted Weiss, who had relatively few drivers and many transit riders in his district, stood by NRDC, and Congressman Jonathan Bingham called for tolls on bridges except those that came into his district.⁴⁶ In another example, Senator Thomas Eagleton, who played a prominent role in the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act, put pressure on the

1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).

40. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 771-74.

41. See *id.* at 776.

42. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 776-79.

43. See, e.g., *Mission Indus. v. EPA*, 547 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 1976) (affirming EPA's approval of plan although EPA conceded possible random error as high as 150% for annual average of pollutant emissions and 200% for short-term concentrations).

As one commentator remarked in NRDC's magazine: "The deadlines suits have chastened the agencies but they haven't really helped set priorities or clean up the environment." Turner, *The Legal Eagles*, *AMICUS J.*, Winter, 1988, at 25, 28 (quoting Ed Frost, former general counsel of Chemical Manufacturers Association)

44. 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976).

45. *Id.*

46. See *N.Y. Times*, Mar. 8, 1977, at 30, col. 3.

EPA Administrator to take account of the economic importance of the lead industry to his state when it set the standard for lead.⁴⁷

What enabled legislators to be all things to all interests was the enactment of legislation that delegated the essential legislative task of making rules of conduct—the emission limitations—and to save for itself the task of establishing goals and rules of procedure. Setting goals is attractive to legislators because they need only set the popular ones. Making rules of procedure is also desirable because the procedure obscures the failure to make tough choices.

When the 1977 deadline for achieving the ambient standards drew near, Congress did not change the fundamentals of its convenient legislative scheme. Instead, it enacted amendments that postponed the deadline to 1982 for some pollutants and 1987 for others.⁴⁸ Congress also stopped EPA from imposing some unpopular emission controls on automobiles and politically potent industries without saying what other controls EPA should impose to meet the health goals.⁴⁹

The 1977 amendments to the Act have worked much like the original 1970 legislation. Neither the 1982 nor 1987 deadlines have been achieved. Since 1980, Congress has worked on amending the 1977 legislation to deal with lapsed deadlines and other problems, such as acid rain and the largely unregulated hazardous air pollutants, but nothing has emerged. Stalemate is often desirable for Congress because its members need not cast controversial votes and can continue to blame EPA when constituents complain about pollution. New leadership in the White House and the Senate may produce new clean air legislation, but it will be interesting to see if any new legislation avoids the seductiveness of delegation. Specifically, will Congress deal with acid rain by promulgating its own emission limits—with or without emissions trading⁵⁰—thereby replacing the baroque delegations of the 1970 Act?

B. *An Alternative Approach*

47. This was documented in the administrative proceedings. See Joint Appendix at 2717-21, *Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA*, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir 1980), *cert. denied*, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).

48. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 774-75.

49. *Id.* at 770-71.

50. See Tripp & Dudek, *Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs*, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1989).

Congress could have solved most of the air pollution problem, as it was perceived in 1970, if it had enacted emission limits for large boilers and the steel and chemical industries rather than delegating to EPA the plenary power to regulate all manner of sources.⁵¹ Legislative rules could create emission limits that would be enforceable directly by citizen suits or government action. In contrast, to control a pollutant under a National Ambient Air Quality Standards requires multiple steps:

1. EPA must determine that the pollutant should be the subject of a National Ambient Air Quality Standard;⁵²
2. EPA must promulgate the standard;⁵³
3. the state must adopt a plan containing emission limits;⁵⁴
4. EPA must determine if the plan is adequate;⁵⁵
5. if the state plan is disapproved, EPA must promulgate a plan for the state.⁵⁶

Each of these steps takes at least one to two years; the entire procedure often takes many years.

Since there are numerous harmful pollutants, states, revisions of state plans, and requirements that pollutants also be regulated under additional procedures of the Act, the delegation has generated literally thousands of rulemaking proceedings. Each requires the attention of teams of technicians, administrators, and lawyers. There is significantly more delay and a much larger commitment of resources when serious disputes arise. The system is so complicated and uncertain that business and government officials have trouble determining simply what pollution controls apply in a given factory today, let alone those that will apply in the future. In speaking of environmental law in general, James Moorman, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund's first executive director, said: "We erect an elaborate maze and defeat ourselves. The result has raised the costs to industry to no reasonable end."⁵⁷

51. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11.

52. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (1982).

53. *Id.* § 7409.

54. *Id.* § 7410.

55. *Id.*

56. *Id.*

57. See Turner, *supra* note 43, at 34.

Delegation certainly did not insulate environmental decision-making from politics, as had been hoped. Instead, delegation shifted decisionmaking from a highly visible political arena, Congress, to less visible ones within federal agencies and state governments. This decreased visibility benefitted industry since the public is usually better able to influence the national legislative process than it is able to influence the agencies.⁵⁸ The public can get interested in whether Congress will vote for national emission limits for power plants supported by environmentalists, by industry, or by EPA. Such public interest means media coverage and influence over the legislative process. But in giving EPA the regulatory authority to establish limits, the operative questions are determined in thousands of discrete proceedings and are framed in highly technical terms. For instance, the revision of an individual state's plan may concern only one of many smoke stacks, at one of many power plants, and it may turn on whether the state environmental agency fed the appropriate weather data into the appropriate diffusion model.⁵⁹ Almost no one understands the issue or its significance, and everyone finds it *boring*. Moreover, the fragmentation of decisionmaking means that NRDC and its allies can fight only a fraction of the relevant battles given their limited resources.

Delegation is not only a poor way of achieving substantive environmental goals. Delegation also raises issues of principle as to the process in which public interest environmental lawyers play a part. The Act, unlike previous legal regimes, outlawed compromising the protection of health. But even the authors of the legislation knew that tragic choices were inevitable.⁶⁰ Their failure to face them helped to give us power. Moreover, we were willing to tar government officials as violating the law for failing to protect health when we knew that their supposed transgression usually was a disagreement about an inevitable choice between different degrees of risk to health.

The ultimate author of this demagoguery was Congress. Demagoguery is the pursuit of power through riling passions and prejudices against something.⁶¹ Members of Congress struck a pose *against* any harm to health without taking a stand *for* the steps necessary

58. See generally Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, *supra* note 15.

59. See *Mission Indus. v. EPA*, 547 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 1976).

60. See Schoenbrod, *supra* note 11, at 763 n.139.

61. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 598 (rev. ed. 1968).

to protect health. Legislating rules would have required compromises that would have exposed legislators to the public's displeasure. Some voters would blame Congress for leaving them exposed to too much risk and others would have blamed Congress for imposing excessive pollution control costs.

The Act, which we private attorneys general embraced, ultimately proved less useful than we had hoped because it enabled our elected representatives to escape accountability for difficult decisions on pollution control. Delegation helps to explain why ninety-eight percent of the congressional incumbents that run get reelected.⁶² Congress patronized the public by hiding the difficult choices. The public still wants health protected, just as the statute promises is possible. Congressional debate and enactment of compromise emission controls would have developed a better informed public that is more capable of resolving important environmental political issues.

Conclusion

Our support for the legislators who professed environmental convictions was reciprocated. They often honored the wishes of public interest groups on questions of legislation, made sure that we testified prominently at congressional hearings and were heard by administrative agencies, and sometimes helped public interest groups raise funds.

The dividing line between the public interest and the private interests of public interest lawyers is not always clear. Just as surely as public interest lawyers' power can be used for their vision of the public good, power and prestige in themselves are also private goods.

In retrospect, there is a huge difference between what I thought public interest law would be and what it is. I had envisioned it as a crusade for the public good in which private interests, our own included, took a back seat.⁶³ I had seen public interest litigation and lobbying as a war against politics as usual. From today's perspective, however, the distinction between the tactics of mainstream public interest environmental litigation groups and the lobbying arms of various industries is less clear. Much of public interest environmental law today is lobbying,

62. See Wall St. J., July 19, 1988, at 28.

63. I remember the NRDC staff meeting in the mid-1970s when the misguided majority, including myself, vehemently opposed raising any attorney's salary above \$16,000.

publicizing, and publishing—all desirable and essential parts of politics as usual. Public interest environmental law has become part of the system rather than an external force pressuring for changes in the system itself.

There are some lessons to be gleaned from this experience. First, efforts to achieve a noble goal by legislation that supposedly circumvents politics will not succeed in removing that goal from the entanglements of politics. Second, the legislation is likely to change the political process in a way that obscures the issue, thereby quite possibly doing more harm than good. Had Congress not passed the 1970 Act, public desire for cleaner air would have put pressure on Congress and its state counterparts to make the hard choices. Third, there is a public interest in procedure as well as in substantive goals. I wish that I had realized that sooner.