Humanity’s Law:
Rule of Law for the New Global Politics

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This Article proposes that international law is undergoing a paradigm shift, which will have significant implications for foreign affairs. A dramatic expansion of legal machinery, institutions, and processes is occurring in the international sphere. Now, more than ever before foreign policy decision-making occurs in the shadow of the law. The conception of a new rule of law is at stake; appropriate to the present state of global politics, as it aims to manage heightened political conflict and violence through law. The impact of the juridical paradigm shift is primarily discursive. The expanded legal discourse represented by the present international human rights system contributes a rhetoric that both enables and constrains politics but whose constructive potential is not infinitely malleable. Understanding this paradigm shift requires new interpretive principles, which is the larger project for which this Article lays the foundation.

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The new humanitarianism is the rule of law that emerged from a world of contradictory political conditions. As a rule of law, it comprehends the dimensions of democratization, political fragmentation, and disorder's coexistence. The fall of the Soviet Union and the related rise of U.S. power, as well as post-Soviet transitions and other recent political and social transformations, form the context for the paradigm shift now occurring in international law. Political, economic, and technological changes have led to globalizing ramifications that have transformed the core rule of law values in the international legal order and created a shift away from the previously prevailing state-centric system. These globalizing processes have numerous ramifications for the structure of a simultaneously expanding and disaggregating international order. Its dominant conception of the rule of law is based on the "humanitarian" regime, which is an expanded version of what is traditionally called the "law of war." For the most part, the enhanced role of the humanitarian regime in contemporary politics is not yet adequately understood, because it is to some extent still in its infancy and thus lacks a thoroughgoing jurisprudence, particularly with respect to the rights dimensions in the expanded law of war.

This Article takes the first steps in the project of interpreting the newly expanded international legal regime by elucidating the significance of adopting an expanded juridical discourse. Further, this Article aims to clarify the relevance of international law within the changing constitution of the globalizing world order. Recent developments in humanitarian law guide contemporary global politics by structuring international rule of law's policymaking with respect to the heightened disorder associated with end-of-century political transformation. This new international legalism—"humanity's law"—assists in framing and legitimating the form of policymaking choices in present global politics.


6. See Held et al., supra note 3; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (1999); Ken Jentz, New World Disorder: The Lennienn Extinction (1994) (discussing the political destabilization that occurred as a consequence of the collapse of communism).

7. See Lea Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World (1994) (focusing on American international hegemony and arguing that the "legitimacy of international hegemony should be evaluated in the same way as the legitimacy of other authoritative political structures, particularly domestic governments")

legal system and have significant consequences for the rule of law.9

The present international political context is more democratic10 yet also less stable, because increasing political fragmentation creates potential for political violence.11 Though perhaps paradoxical, the new democratization is largely associated with the post-Cold War transformations, a time when political violence profoundly increased and a host of inadequately consolidated transitional regimes appeared.12 This new political reality challenges prevailing assumptions regarding the comparative roles of dictatorships and democracies in maintaining the peace.13 Recognition of the prevailing political conditions of increased violence clarifies the contemporary turn to a dominant conception of global rule of law in terms of an enlarged law of war.

The primary change in the international legal regime is that humanitarian law has expanded and has a greater reach. Its expanded legal rhetoric reflects changing conceptions of legitimacy in contemporary international politics and represents a paradigm shift between divergent conceptions of the rule of law in the international domain.14 Understanding the significance of the greater juridification of international affairs discourse requires new interpretative principles, which this Article begins to lay forth.

In order to do so, this Article explores the relationship between the contemporary international law regime and foreign affairs. Part I introduces the new rule of law and examines the dynamic interaction between the emerging humanitarian law regime and the rapidly changing political conditions of global politics. Part II analyzes the role of the new international legalism in foreign affairs. Subsequently, Part III focuses on the effects of merging the two legal regimes. Finally, Part IV addresses the role of the legal scheme in globalizing politics, specifically its redefinition of security in international politics.

9. See Sussen supra note 8, at 92; Slaughter, supra note 8, at 183–84; Spiro, supra note 8, at 1223.
10. Democracy has grown chiefly in terms of open elections. See generally Held et al., supra note 3; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999).
12. See generally Jouvent, supra note 6 (discussing political destabilization following the communist collapse).
14. For elaboration see infra text accompanying notes 157–72.

16. For a comprehensive exposition of the contemporary law of war, see generally WINTER CRIMES, supra note 4.
17. This argument is distinguishable from constructivist arguments. This Article argues that the law plays a constitutive role in contemporary politics, but it does not advocate the constructivist view that these uses necessarily imply expression of determinate values of justice. Indeed, the argument elaborated in my previous work is more limited and pragmatic. See Ruth Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 158 Yale L.J. 712 (1999) (arguing that in periods of political change the law can be used to play multiple roles, both constraining and enabling). For a useful discussion of distinctions between the approaches of constructivism and pragmatism, see Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Principles and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, Presented to the Olin Institute’s National Security Seminar at Harvard University (Dec. 2001) (unpublished paper on file with author). For a discussion of constructivism, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society 2–3 (1996); Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITIES: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996); THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 7–8, 236, 237–70 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (using an approach that generally draws on social constructivism); see also Alexander Wendt, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999) (developing a theory of the international system as a social construction).
A. A Discourse with a New Reach

In the new humanitarianism, the normative apparatus of the law of war, particularly its criminal justice dimension, is expanding beyond its historic role. International jurisdiction's demonstrable extension is occurring across the dimensions of time and space, and is redefining political time and boundaries. Historically, international criminal processes were deployed ex post, or after the peace. However, in the contemporary moment the law of war is being invoked ex ante, or before war, coming in much earlier in foreign policy deliberations and at times even in lieu of military intervention.¹⁹

First, "humanity's law" extends humanitarian law in terms of political time because it evokes the discourse of justice earlier in policymaking processes and thus changes the rule of law's role in international politics. Historically "justice talk" was entirely ex post. International adjudicatory processes were deployed following international armed conflicts prompted by state violations of international law, and were used to retroactively rationalize infringement on state sovereignty.²⁰ Currently, however, the humanitarian regime comes in much earlier in policy debates, particularly in deliberations regarding intervention in human rights crises.²¹ For example, early introduction of humanitarian law occurred in the deliberations concerning the appropriate international response to the Balkans conflict.²² This apparent expansion in international humanitarian regime gives "justice talk" a bigger role in contemporary foreign policymaking.

Second, the new humanitarian regime creates a spatial transformation by expanding the humanitarian regime's jurisdiction in terms of territoriality that extends across national borders. Historically, the law of war applied in times of international conflict. In contrast, it is now more generally applied and extends to situations of internal political conflict. Contemporary humanitarian law reaches well beyond the parameters of

²³. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 19; War Crimes, supra note 4 (offering a comprehensive historical account); Teitel, supra note 5.

²⁴. See U.N. CHAIRMAN, art. 1.

²⁵. In the traditional nation-state regime, the protection of individual human rights was connected to nationality. See Henry J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 93-94, 1251-52 (2d ed. Oxford 2000).
view of the meaning of global order, as evidenced in the present expansion of the treaty regime defining the law of war. The merger between humanitarian law and human rights law gives rise to a complicated and somewhat contradictory legal regime that challenges the very basis of longstanding notions of international rule of law. Whereas international rule of law was defined in terms relating to state sovereignty and self-determination, there is now a shift to a juridical definition of the state and an alternative discourse framed in the universalizing language of human rights.

C. A Reconceptualized Personality

Transformations in the new legal regime's subject transcend changes relating to its values and jurisdictional parameters. The traditional state-centered view of personality predicated on the view of the state as the relevant subject of the international regime, has numerous implications for the meaning of international rule of law, such as the understanding of equality and reciprocity as the cardinal rule of law principles governing international relations. Consequently, the protection of territorial sovereignty traditionally defined the international rule of law. In contrast, the new paradigm weds traditional humanism with the law of human rights, causing a shift away from states as the dominant subjects of international law to include "persons" and "peoples.

30. See D. P. O’Connell, International Law 80 (2d ed. 1970); Starke’s International Law 85 (A. S. N. Swaim ed., 11th ed. 1992) (arguing that states are the principal subjects of international law); see also ROXANNE HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROSE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 39 (1994) (discussing the classic view that international law applies to states, and arguing that there is growing perception that international law is relevant to international actors other than states).
32. The central principles of state sovereignty are legal equality in relation to other states and the right to be free from the use of force against its territorial integrity. See RUTTI TEICHL, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, 3 LEGAL AFF. 26–27 (2002).
33. See infra text accompanying note 36; Global Law Without a State (Gunter Teubner ed., 1997).

A. A Tiered Subjectivity Comes into Relief in the Expanded Legal Personality of the Expanded Humanitarian Regime

A tiered subjectivity comes into relief in the extended legal personality of the expanded humanitarian regime. The nation-state is no longer the sole subject of international law because the new regime is also potentially applicable to groups and persons. These developments in the transforming juridical discourse reflect the paradigm shift now underway in the conceptualization of international rule of law. This new subjectivity is evident in the heightened enforcement of the expanded norms, which are directed beyond states to persons and peoples. These new enforcement structures are elaborated upon below.

D. A New Institutionalization

Finally, another dimension of the juridical transformation is its enforcement and entrenchment through international institutionalization. The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable expansion in the institutionalization of international law. These new institutions, which range from the international courts to nongovernmental organizations, mediate both public and private realms. Currently, the humanitarian regime is being entrenched through codifications chartering new international judicial institutions that make criminal justice the primary means of enforcing international rights law.

Although international criminal tribunals began on an ad hoc basis, they have become the international community’s primary response to humanitarian crises. A consensus on establishing a new institution dedicated to ongoing international adjudication of violations of humanitarian law is seen in the consolidating of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the Balkans and Rwanda, leading to the recent establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court. Consequently, there is now a turn to an expanded discourse of international criminal justice. The charters that form bases of the new international tribunals complicate traditional understandings of

35. For a discussion of "peoples," see JAMES W. BALL, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1998); Slaughter supra note 8, at 183–84 (discussing disaggregation in globalizing politics).
36. On the merger of international humanitarian law and human rights law, see ICC Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7 (defining "crimes against humanity" and proscribing "persecution against any identifiable group or category on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . grounds") as part of "widespread or systematic attack directed against one, civilian population." Id. at (b)); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Jurisdiction Appeal (stating that "a state sovereignty approach has been gradually supplanted by a human being oriented approach"); Louis Henkin, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 16–17 (1992).
37. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
38. One aspect of these new regulatory structures involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For an elaboration of their role, see MARGARET E. ROBIC & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1997).
40. Id. The ICC Statute became active when sixty ratifications were obtained. There are presently eighty-four ratifications and one hundred thirty-nine signatures. See http://www.icc-cpi.int/countryinfo/world-signs-and-ratifications.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).
41. See ICTY Statute, supra note 23; ICTR Statute, supra note 23.
42. See ICC Statute, supra note 18.
the law of war, the parameters of war and peace and the state's duties to its citizens, by extending international jurisdiction beyond national borders and situations of conflict to penetrate states during times of peace.43

The establishment of an international regime that contemplates the coercive enforcement of humanitarian law reflects a reconceptualization of the rule of law in the international order. The aim of the newly established enforcement machinery in the form of independent international institutions dedicated to enforcing humanitarian law supports the perception of a heightened international rule of law. These new international institutions incorporate criminal sanctions into the international legal system. Criminal sanctions are a distinctive dimension of legal norms and can plausibly be used to signal and reinforce the difference between general and positive law norms.45 Moreover, criminal sanctions have distinctive constructive potential.46

Changes concerning the central elements of the expanded humanitarian regimes primarily signal a move towards a greater juridification of foreign affairs. This shift illustrates the law's new constructivist potential.47 A new discourse in the international realm enables the reconceptualization of present international political circumstances, and an attendant redirecting of the course of current foreign policy deliberations and policy. The constitutive relation of law and politics in international affairs is a complex dynamic. At minimum, the new juridical approach allows law to reframe and shift the parameters of existing politics. The next Part explores some of the implications of international legalism's rise, as well as its relation to the politics of globalization.

44. On the challenge to the differentiation of international and internal conflicts, see ICC Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7 (concerning jurisdiction for crimes against humanity); Tadic decision of 2 October 1995, ¶ 148-134; see also Ruti Teitel, supra note 21, at 184 (arguing that the ICTY expanded the international criminal jurisdiction first established at the Nuremberg Trials to cover "crimes against humanity" when they are committed within the state). The ICTR evidences another instance of expansion of international criminal jurisdiction which, while an international tribunal, prosecuted solely intrastate crimes committed in the Rwanda genocide. See ICTR Statute, supra note 23, at art. 4.
45. See generally H. L. A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-14 (Oxford 1961) (discussing the use of sanctions for norm strengthening functions in domestic law); Judith N. Shklar, LEGALISM, LAW, MOALS, AND POLITICAL TRAILS (1986) (discussing legalism as an ideology internal to the legal profession and, more importantly for the purposes of this Article, as political ideology). Growing emphasis on positivism in international law has tended to derive largely from American jurisprudence. See Anthony Sheck, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998); Teitel supra note 17, at 2016-30 (offering a comparative perspective to positivism in the rule of law).
46. To date, there has been little exploration of the distinctive contribution of criminal law to the constructivist theory of law. On constructivism generally, see supra note 17 and accompanying text. In particular, the question arises of whether the role of coercive sanctions should be accounted for within the context of traditional international law premised on consent or within constructivist theory generally premised on other techniques of persuasion. This Article attempts to advance this question. See infra text accompanying notes 92-100.
47. For some of the scholars advocating constructivism in the law, see supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Ruti G. Teitel, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 4-6 (2000).
The change in the perception of international law's legitimacy is occurring now for several reasons, all of which relate to a number of domestic and international developments. First, the enhancement of international law's authority relates to significant changes in political conditions on the domestic front through the weakening of national institutions. This weakening occurs in newly transitional states, although the impact of the globalization process is also felt in consolidated nation-states. The international legal system's transformation has evident domestic ramifications, particularly regarding foreign affairs decision-making processes as evidenced in a recently invigorated debate in the United States over the appropriate role of international law in the American constitutional scheme.

The international humanitarian regime's enhanced legal potential is also attributable to multiple institutional changes on the international
front; namely developments in the juridical regime such as the newly chartered international legal institutions and related proceedings. The new humanitarian regime reconsiders core international law principles regarding sovereignty and personality in the international order, and transforms dimensions of state obligations and individual rights in a globalizing politics. The new legal lexicon links the evolving political changes associated with globalization processes with changing standards relating to the protection of humanitarian rights in the international realm.

Thus, in the transforming legal regime there is a shift in the relevant locus of authority from the national to the international and from the state to transnational institutions and other political actors implicated in various dimensions of globalization processes. This demonstrable move to law, with or without the state, represents a turn to an alternative source of authority, a development that relates to the aims of globalizing politics.

A. The Rhetoric of Justice

When it is understood in the context of the heightened political disorder associated with the last two decades, the turn to humanitarian law and legal processes reveals the extent to which international criminal justice has become the basis for the new emergent legal rule of law. The turn to humanitarian law represents a move, not only to an increased and expanded legalism, but also to a distinctive discourse of justice.

To begin, a historical vantage point elucidates the extent to which contemporary rule of law’s meaning in the international realm has become more and more coincident with international criminal justice. The meaning of international rule of law has evolved over time and reflects the accumulation of the use of law to manage conflict. A century’s experience lays the basis for the use of international criminal justice to legitimate international intervention. Contemporary humanitarian law is grounded on the preexisting scheme of the law of war where the legal precedents of the last century and more particularly, the human rights crises of the twentieth century, continue to guide the emerging humanitarian law regime. This conventional framework lays the basis for the now transformed rule of law reflected in the prevailing international regime.

Currently, the humanitarian scheme is being applied to changing political circumstances. The core predicates of the postwar regime are undergoing a substantial transformation that goes to the basic structure and core values of the international legal system. However, these changes are hardly self-evident, nor do they comport easily with intuitions about the present direction of international law. Therefore, a better understanding of the constitutive interaction of law and politics necessitates the application of interpretive principles regarding the historical development of the international legal domain. From a positive law perspective, the historical law of war has expanded to merge with the peacetime human rights law to constitute the new humanitarian regime. The evident tension in the background conditions of international humanitarian law—beyond war to peacetime—is definitional, as it moves the boundaries of the law of war beyond international armed conflict. In the contemporary moment, the humanitarian legal regime reaches beyond the reach of international relations as historically understood and transcends traditional international armed conflict to reach other situations of conflict occurring within the nation state.

65. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 11–19; also Geneva Convention 1, supra note 23; ICTY Statute, supra note 23; ICJ, supra note 23; Meron, supra note 23, at 354–55 (noting that despite some states’ efforts “to limit the reach of international law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, the criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have contributed significantly to the development of international humanitarian law and its extension to non-international armed conflicts”).

66. There is a growing literature on the emergence of relevant actors. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 38.

67. These uses of international justice are analogous to other historical instances of the use of law to regulate faraway territories through royal law and colonial law. See Martin Steinberg, GENOCIDE: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 23 (1984) (noting that a major function of courts in many societies is to assist in holding the countryside, providing an extraterritorial court to adjust relations among the occupying parties according to their own rules, as well as a body of national law in order to facilitate central administration). See Teitel, supra note 47, at 33–39.

68. As a historical matter, this is exemplified by the emphasis in the Nuremberg Tribunals on the prosecution of the arch offenses of “aggression” and the “crime against the peace.” For an extensive historical account, see Taylor, supra note 19; Teitel, supra note 19, at 44.


70. See MICHAEL WALKER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 51–63 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the legalist paradigm).

71. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 7.

72. See Teitel, supra note 5, at 301–15. Historically, the paradigmatic bases are the two predecessor international legal regimes established, first, by the Westphalia treaty after the Religious Wars, and then subsequently by the treaties following World War II. On the development of the law of war, see also CHRISTINE GRIFFITH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000); see generally WAR CRIMES, supra note 4.


The broader significance of this transformation is that the new emerging rule of law transforms the historical values associated with the long-standing Westphalian international security arrangement, which is primarily understood in terms of the stability of state borders. Moreover, the preexisting regime conceived of rights as nationality-based and protected by the sovereign state. Just as the prior international legal regime, premised on state sovereignty and self-determination, was associated with the growth of modern nationalism,69 the new legal developments of the emergent humanitarian law regime are associated with the contemporary phenomena of global transition and globalization. The expanded humanitarian legal regime reestablishes the meaning of rule law in the new global politics. Linking international criminal law to the broader project of peacemaking, the new codifications transcend ordinary rule of law values while giving expression to dynamic norms that reconstruct the relevant understandings of international security.70

In the new humanitarianism, rule of law is not solely defined in terms of the prevailing status lexicon of national self-determination and state sovereignty. Instead, the new discourse goes to the very core of the prevailing paradigm. The present move shifts the emphasis from the protection of state borders or territoriality, which is the core of the established state system, to other more juridical dimensions of the state such as the stability of peoples.71 The transformed discourse is appropriate for contemporary globalizing politics because it complements the prevailing state-centered approach and its attention to the protection of state borders, with an approach that is predicated on alternative humanitarian concerns.

B. The Role of Humanitarian Discourse in the New Global Politics

Currently, there is a heightened reliance on law, legal processes, and judicial structures in international politics, which raises a question about how to interpret these judicial developments. The emerging international humanitarian legal regime supports a transformation of global politics through its articulation of an international discourse of rule of law.72 Several dimensions of this regime are discussed below. Global rule of law both enables and restrains power in today’s political circumstances in order to manage new conditions of political disorder through the rubric of law.

In the absence of a common world government73 or world court, it is the humanitarian legal regime that is used to lend authority and legitimacy to the international realm through its tribunals, proceedings, judicial language, and public justification processes. Humanitarian law and courts are the preeminent institutions and processes aimed at managing present global politics and representing the legalist view on how to advance the core international rule of law’s goal of ending political violence.74

Greater reliance on the judiciary is both a distinct institutional response and an alternative process for resolving international controversies. There are multiple bases for this institutional shift. New humanitarianism is the rule of law for contemporary political circumstances of heightened political disorder. Historically, courts have performed the societal function of managing social conflict, particularly concerning the governance of far-away territories.75 This managerial role has reemerged


82. See Teitel, supra note 21 at 177-93 (1999); see generally SIMON, supra note 45 (discussing legalism).

83. These political circumstances have been characterized as those of "small wars and weak states." See Jack Straw, Mercenaries, Mail Mike Comes in from the Cold, Economy, Feb. 14, 2002, at 55; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.

in recent politics. The judiciary's established management functions clarify the remarkable resurgence of extraterritorial law and courts associated with globalization. Once again, as in colonial times, the legal system's extension and penetration goes beyond the scope of existing political sovereignty. Law's jurisdiction extends beyond state borders to non-state actors, thus echoing earlier historical understandings of the "law of nations." Under the global rule of law regime, political controversies are plausibly adjudicated by faraway third party jurisdictions. These political circumstances, where courts operate on their own and lack other effective global mechanisms, highlight the singularly constructive potential of the law.

In its rhetorical function, the language of justice is mediating, building upon international adjudicative processes to help manage and legitimate international conflict. Indeed, the expanded humanitarian regime contemplates both the expression and enforcement of norms. This potential for judicial enforcement gives the new law norms a sense of reality. The current paradigm shift enables a move away from purely political discourse of state interests vindicable in collective exercises of self-determination, to legalist rhetoric of rights vindicable in courts of law. Juridical processes amenable to resolution convert matters of policy into matters of law. The new international legalism's regular justificatory processes offer the potential for rationalizing international policymaking. Structured processes of justification create a sense of a global order.

Humanitarian norms constitute the emerging global order and serve a primarily discursive function. More and more, a depoliticized legal language of rights and wrongs, duties and obligations, is supplanting the dominant political language based on state interests, deliberation, and consensus. An expanded humanitarian discourse offers an alternative basis for global governance, one in which the notion of rule of law is largely discursive and international legalism plays a distinctly constructive role. Law in transformative periods both enables and constrains political power. It enables a redefining and reconceptualizing of the interests at stake in international conflict. This is a change from conventional terms where security was defined largely in terms of state interests because now

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Latin American: A Case Book (1975) (explaining that this was particularly true of colonial courts).

85. See Shapiro, supra note 67 (providing a comparative analysis of courts).

86. On globalization generally, see Held et al., supra note 3, at 62-87; Transnational Legal Processes, supra note 59, at 383-89. For historical discussion of the "law of nations," see W. Blackstone, Four Commentaries on the Laws of England 67 (1st ed. 1765-1769); see also Hugo Grotius, De jure bell i ac pacis 16 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1913).

87. See generally Hart, supra note 45; Simard, supra note 45.

88. The turn to the language of law mediates the rhetoric of pure politics, on the one hand, and pure moralism on the other. On this point, see Hart, supra note 45 at 212-22, 225-28; see also Hennigh, supra note 79, at 82-84, 88-90, 91 (2d ed. 1979).

89. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the ICTY's relation to NATO intervention in Kosovo).


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the new humanitarian rights terminology defines the meaning of security more broadly in terms of the preservation of stability across national lines and population permanence.

C. The Uses of International Criminal Law

The humanitarian legal regime is well suited for a changing global politics, because the language of criminal justice enables the reconceptualizing of conflict from the local and national to the global, and responsibility from the collective to the individual. Through the humanitarian legal regime's institutions and processes, a formerly purely local conflict exclusively amenable to domestic management is transformable into a situation meriting international attention. The new rule of law reconceives and delimits the prevailing principles of state sovereignty and self-determination in the global order by rendering national and international regulation ambiguous. By so doing, the new legalism offers a basis for reconceptualizing relevant interests in contemporary politics.

International criminal law processes appear to play a particularly important role in globalization because they enable a degree of reconceptualization of the public and private realms. International criminal law has significant constructive potential because international criminal enforcement introduces substantial flexibility into the characterizations of conflict situations. Further, the expanded enforcement associated with the international law of armed conflict enables the transformation of traditional understandings of responsibility in the international sphere from the national to the international, and from the collective to the individual. Expanded enforcement lends new authority to the recognition of added legal personality in the globalizing system. This process of piercing the veil of state power began at Nuremberg, where the post-World War II Charter went beyond existing international law to reconstruct alternative concepts of international and criminal law jurisdiction. A core change emerging from the merger of the laws of war and human rights is the ongoing application of the rules of the regime beyond states.

As visible in the new international criminal codes, the scope of international criminal law has been entirely reconceived with extended jurisdiction to regulate the use of force beyond states. In this post-Westphalia rule of law regime, both state and non-state actors are potential subjects of
the new legal system.94 This growing importance of non-state actors in
globalism is perhaps most evident in the law of human rights because the
individual is preeminently its subject.95 In this regard, the recently
expanded humanitarian regime goes beyond the traditional law of war and
its categorical distinctions of war and peace and combatant and civilian to
propose a broader view of protected status and personality in the system.96

Although to some extent international criminal law builds upon
existing understandings of rule of law in the domestic context, particularly
in the present political circumstances, the uses and forms of criminal law
in the international setting are distinguishable from those of their domestic
counterpart. Law does not have a unitary logic. The new international
legalism has been heralded as a form of transformative jurisprudence
with the ambitious aim of laying the foundation for global society in the absence
of predicate political consensus or accountability. In the new humanitarian
law, definitions of a transforming global rule of law, and
thus serves a mediating function.97 The new humanitarianism’s primary
role is to offer a coherent discourse that rationalizes the dimensions of
current foreign policy and supports the international judicial regime’s
move from its historical guardianship of nationalist politics to its contem-
porary guardianship of a globalizing politics.

III. The Effects of the Merger of Two Legal Regimes

A. Globalizing the Law of War

Parts I and II discuss the constitutive aspects of the new humanitarian
regime, particularly the dimensions of its potential applicability to foreign
affairs. This section examines the ramifications of the extended humanitarian
regime on international law. The newly entrenched humanitarian
regime is an odd hybrid of two previously autonomous legal regimes: the
law of war and the law of human rights. Their merger has significant
ramifications for both regimes, as well as for the international legal system
as a whole. The awkward fit between the law of war and the international
human rights regime exposes the tension and incoherence in both regimes.
Their merger, particularly seen in the expansion of humanitarian
discourse, has numerous effects that alter international law’s process of
downscaling, structure, subject, and values.

and 38 I.L.M. 581, 644 (1999) (discussing the evolution of the concept of individual
responsibility under international law).
95. See Michael Ignatieff et al., Human Rights as Politics and Humanitarianism 63-98,
109-13, 166-67 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) (discussing the individual’s place in human
rights law); see generally McDougall & Reisman, supra note 4; Franks, supra note 34.
96. See Velasquez Rodriguez, Case 7920, Ser. C., No. 4, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 35, OEA/
C) No. 4 (1988); supra note 17 and accompanying text (judgment of July 29, 1988).
97. For a discussion of law’s role in this process of global political transition and the
constructive force of international humanitarian law as incorporated in national criminal
judicatures, see Teitel, supra note 32, at 20-21, 33-34; see also Singh, supra note 45 at 130.

At the same time it extends the humanitarian regime, the attempted
merger poses a threat to the continued existence of an independent inter-
national human rights discourse. Indeed, as is elaborated below, the displac-
ment of the established human rights vocabulary by that of law of
war goes to the very heart of the meaning of “human rights.”

The merger of these two regulatory schemes complicates the concept
of protected status as well as the related understandings of subjectivity and
personality in international law. First, consider the extent to which the law
of war limits state action in periods of conflict98 and human rights law
limits state behavior in periods of peace.99 Historically, the law of war had
an internal perspective because it was understood to involve states consens-
usally agreeing to constrain themselves by setting the bounds of permissible
conflict. In contrast, the law of human rights had an external
perspective, as persons were protected independently from their nation-
state, potentially altogether independent of state action.100 At the juncture
of these two regimes, emerges a dichotomous constitutional self.

Humanitarian law’s expansion is generally regarded as a humanizing
and progressive step,101 because the expanded regime extends the protec-
tions of the law of war beyond the conditions of international armed
conflict102 to citizens in peacetime.103 Whereas, under the law of war the
parameters of normative protection are themselves defined by the character
of the conflict,104 in human rights law the relevant protected status is
accorded on other bases.105 However, the historical law of war had given
rise to an apparent perversity in international law, a gap whereby non-
nationals obtained greater protection than nationals under international
law.106 After all, historically the law of war protected so-called “enemy”
aliens in conditions of international armed conflict.107

The expanded humanitarian law reconciles this contradiction. In the
globalized humanitarian regime, contracting states no longer have monop-
olistic power over the protection of their citizens’ rights. This expansion in
the scope and subject of humanitarian law has progressive normative con-

98. See supra note 23.
100. See Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the
American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 74 & 75, CC/282, Inter-Am. CER, Series A,
101. See Meron, supra note 6.
102. Those protected included noncombatants in situations of armed conflict. See
War Crimes, supra note 4.
103. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 4; Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzeg-
104. See Geneva Conventions, supra notes 23 and 73.
105. On human rights theory, see Theses of Rights (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984);
Marie-Cristine, What Are Human Rights? (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1973); Yoram
Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law, in Human
106. See Geneva Convention, supra note 23 (discussing treatment of combatants);
Dinstein, supra note 105, at 345, 347.
107. See War Crimes, supra note 4.
sequences because extending human rights beyond nationality is an important move away from status. Yet, as elaborated below, the gain is modest because even under the new global rule of law the relevant ascriptive status remains complicated, beyond nationality to subnational and transnational status. Therefore, the central normative work of the expanded humanitarian regime is to redefine the relevant norms, namely as is appropriate to the globalizing order, protecting against violations of the laws of war and human rights on the basis of transnational “humanity” status. 108

In this regard, the expanded humanitarian regime has normative dimensions aimed at strengthening international rule of law. While the present expansion of humanitarian law appears to be a progressive step in the direction of a global order, 109 as currently conceived the new rule of law is authoritative. Nevertheless, it might be best understood as a globalization of the law of war. As discussed above, post-Cold War democratization and other political transitions followed by not fully consolidated democratic institutionalization have resulted in diminished national sovereignty and heightened potential for political violence. 110 Thus, the emergent regulatory regime is largely directed at managing systemic political violence. 111

B. The New Human Security Rights

In the present political circumstances, while the humanitarian law scheme is centered upon the animating value of “humanity,” it is protected largely in a negative sense. 112 In this regard, the new “humanitarian”

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108. See, e.g., ICC Statute supra note 18, at art. 7(1), defining a “crime against humanity,” and providing jurisdiction irrespective of nature of the conflict. Under the Rome Statute, the “crime against humanity” means inhumane acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Or of the inhumane acts is “persecution” which is defined as “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of group or collective.” Id. at art. 7(2)(g). According to the Charter of the current ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, . . . committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. In the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts have taken the form of so-called ethnic cleansing. See ICTY Statute, supra note 23, at 117 art. 80; see also Beth Van Schack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COL. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’YS 1, 87 (1999); Reit Teitel, The Universal and the Particular in International Criminal Justice, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 285 (1999). See generally GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (2000).

109. See, e.g., Saven, supra note 8; Feld et al., supra note 3 (noting among other things, that there is a debate about whether globalization as an analytical construct delivers any added value in the search for a coherent understanding of the historical forces shaping the socio-political realities of everyday life).

110. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. To illustrate, these political conditions were particularly evident in the Balkans. See generally Kovač, supra note 6 (discussing the character, development, extinction, and legacy of the Leninist phenomenon).

111. On globalization as a regime of military governance, see generally Feld et al., supra note 3, at 87–149.

112. On the notion of humanitarian rights as the basis of “human security,” see Fan Omer HAMPTON ET AL., MADNESS IN THE MULTITUDE: HUMAN SECURITY AND WORLD DISORD.

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regime is paradoxical because although it implies greater enforcement of rights, the relevant “rights” are limited to those of the most urgent nature, namely those that protect personal integrity from extreme persecution and extermination. 113 In some regard, the instant humanitarian rights are so unsubstantive that it seems incoherent to conceive of them as “rights” at all because they are the minimum personal security rights associated with the rule of law. To whatever extent, the emergent humanitarianism is the guarantee of “liberalism” in the new global order. It is a “liberalism of fear,” a global spin on the right watchman state. 114

Although framed in the language of individual rights, the law of humanity does not necessarily offer an affirmative understanding of “universal” human rights. Instead, the new humanitarian regime protects “humanity,” in the terms of the “peoples” that make up global humanity. 115 While the hybridized regime is nominally in the language of individual human rights, the particular rights protected such as those regarding “persecution” and “ethnic cleansing” are peculiarly and impled rights predicated on the collective. 116 This is the peculiar relevance of the humanitarian regime in the present transition to globalization. The emergent legal regime grounds “humanity” rights not on nationality or universal moral notions, but instead upon a shared rule of law baseline represented by the historical law of war. 117

C. A New Minorities Regime

Further as is explicated above, while the “rights” defined in the new humanitarian law are individual rights of a group character, they are also linked to territorial stability. 118 The expanded humanitarian regime reaches beyond the longstanding international legal regulation of state sover-
ereignty to protect the territorial stability of ethnic and other groups. Insofar as the expanded humanitarian regime defines new norms, relating to the treatment of "peoples" it destabilizes international law's historic nexus between international security with national sovereignty.

However, the scope of transnational rule of law protection is limited to the preservative right against the transfer of ethnic collectives from their present territory, directed at maintaining population permanence. In this regard, the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention is best understood as a principle that limits the existing international system of state sovereignty. The regime is a rule of law apt for a concededly more interconnected world, particularly due to its proposed limiting of ethnic politics on a humanitarian basis, which introduces a normative ceiling on the longstanding political principles of nationalism and self-determination guiding the international realm.

As such, the expanded humanitarian scheme constitutes a minorities regime for the global age. Offering an enforceable standard for the protection of persecuted groups, the contemporary humanitarian scheme limits national jurisdiction and extends international jurisdiction beyond its traditional scope. In the emergent minorities scheme, the new gravamen of


120. See supra notes 4 and 8. However, see the U.N. Charter, art. 55, referring to the rights of "self-determination of peoples.

121. On population permanence and the definition of the state, see IAN BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 569-75 (5th ed. 1998).

122. Historically, the "minority treaties" were the conventional law that provided international law protection of national minorities. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly following the first World War, countries entered into so-called minority treaties that usually protected ethnic minorities within states. See, e.g., Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.L.J. (see A/B) No. 64.

In the post-World War II statutes, the definition of the protective group or collective has expanded beyond nationality—to race and religion. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICCESCR]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). Article 1 of the ICCESCR guarantees the rights of "all peoples," but does not mention ethnicity per se as a protected class. Article 2 notes that "race, color, religion . . . [or] national or social origin" are protected statuses. See also ICC Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7(1)(d) (defining "persecution against any identifiable group or community on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or other grounds" as a crime against humanity).


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"international" jurisdiction protects territorial borders on the basis of nationality as well as ethnicity and related bases. In this new regime, the historical rule of law norm in the international sphere, namely the protection of national sovereignty within the borders of the nation-state, is complemented by an alternative norm that links territorial protection with the rights of "peoples." Premising international jurisdiction on ethnicity implies the extension of preservative rights under international law beyond their preexisting nexus with nationality in two ways.

First, and perhaps the most evident, international law is being extended beyond the nation-state borders. The second, less transparent dimension goes to the substantive right at stake, namely under what circumstances and basis international protection is accorded. While "peoples" have not yet acquired full personality under international law, the new humanitarian regime to some extent implicitly recognizes their protected status under the law.

However, the emphasis on ethnicity has significant consequences. Legalists argue that the law can be used to denationalize ethnicity through the use of the criminal law and its attribution of individual responsibility for ethnic-based persecution. However, their argument is flawed insofar as the offenses that are often at issue, such as massive persecution, tend to involve systemic policies. These policies of systemic persecution involve a mix of individual and collective responsibility. Further, when the law aims to deter future persecution it nevertheless creates the risk that representation of ethnic persecution, albeit in the juridical context, may further ethnicize the political discourse.

The present reversion to international treaties that sound in minorities' regimes illuminates the extent to which the new international law is analogous to and associated with the juridical conditions of the early twentieth century multinational regime. The twentieth century dramatically failed the purpose of the minorities' regime associated with multinational empires. Nevertheless, a form of minorities' regime is occurring in globalization's analogous and unstable political conditions. The new
humanitarian regime contemplates a tiered approach to the rule of law whereby states are initially responsible for the protection of their minorities, however, the regime also lays a basis for international intervention should the states' national mechanisms fail. International intervention is deemed preferable to destabilizing ethnic secession, or transnational intervention. However, where human rights standards are linked to the humanitarian regime—in particular to its distinctive enforcement mechanisms—the hybrid legal system potentially threatens the independent normative status of human rights law. Indeed, the risk of normative conflict is evident in the mixed regime's extension of the bases for humanitarian intervention. The next Part illustrates some of the potential for normative conflict and discusses the full policy implications of changes that are not yet fully transparent.

IV. Foreign Policymaking in the Shadow of the Law

This Part illustrates the context for foreign policymaking in the shadow of the law by exploring the recent humanitarian dilemmas in the Balkans and Rwanda. An examination of these scenarios highlights the role of humanitarian law and some of the problems created by its indeterminacy and risks of politicization. As a rule of law for periods of political change, the new regime both constrains and enables state power in addition to providing a basis for unilateral state military intervention.

A. Rethinking Security

The new international legalism has a normative impact on global politics because the changing rule of law both constrains and enables exercises of state power. The emerging juridical regime transforms the prevailing historical view of international law premised upon the protection of national sovereignty and the borders of the nation-state. This development seems to challenge state sovereignty since the new humanitarian rights contaminate the penetration of conventional state sovereignty and territoriality in order to protect persecuted collectives. In the new global scheme, violations of ethnic sovereignty are no longer regarded as

posed of a series of national and super-national organisms united under a single logic rule, and that the new global form of sovereignty is what they call “empire.” It establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentralized and decenterializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers."

129. See infra notes 134-72 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
131. There is an expanding literature on humanitarian intervention. See Frances Kay, Amending the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention (1999); Gray, supra note 72, at 24-51; Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (1997); Craig R. Roth, Governmental Elite Violence in International Law (1999); Hernández R. Tudón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquest into Law and Morality (2d ed. 1997); Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forceful Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791 (1999); NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 Am. J. INT’T L. 824, 824-60 (1999); W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Pro

domestic matters, but as matters of consequence for the international community.

However, the humanitarian scheme creates divergent and complex conflicts for state sovereignty because the regime both constrains and enables state power. The new legalism offers an ongoing justificatory apparatus for unilateral and multilateral international intervention. As such the new regime, while explicitly oriented towards peace and stability, also predicates norms that enable states for the exercise of state power and military intervention based on humanitarian grounds. These legal developments signal a marked change in the meaning of security in the international realm.

While human rights are often juxtaposed against state security interests, under the new humanitarian scheme that juxtaposition presents a complex tension. The new humanitarainism redefines the meaning of international security by substituting the long-standing understanding of security as protection of state borders with a transformed construction grounded in the discourse of human rights. Under the new humanitarian scheme, preservative human rights operate as proxies for national borders in a globalizing politics. The humanitarian rights at stake are “preservative” in two senses. First, these rights protect against persecution and ethnic cleansing in order to preserve a collective’s ability to survive. Second, these rights promote population permanence and residence in particular territories. As such, human rights under the new humanitarian scheme constitute set juridical constructs of state borders that redefine the meaning of security in global politics. For instance, a threat to a collective’s preservative rights may affect the permanence of that population, thus endangering peaceful global coexistence. It is precisely this threat that would otherwise not be protected under the currently prevailing rule of law norm of state self-determination, which might well point instead to ethnic secession. The expansion of international juridiction aims to stabilize the global order by protecting against the persecution and migration of peoples, threats to territorial integrity in surrounding areas and the balance of political power in the global order. Under the new humanitarian regime, the protected ethnic and other group-related rights limit the currently prevailing ethos of self-determination as the defining dimension of security in the international realm, in so doing redefining and broadening the meaning of stability and security in international law and the global order.

As previously discussed, the political effect of the humanitarian regime’s legal developments is to protect threshold preservative rights. The new humanitarainism allows for a rethinking of the public and private by regulating internal state conflicts. However, the extent to which it does so is highly limited because the newly expanded humanitarian regime takes

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132. See infra notes 132-140.
133. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
the present territorial status quo as a given. Moreover, under the humanitarian regime the question of how economic security relates to military and territorial security is not contestable;134 instead, the apparent role of the new rule of law is to sustain the status quo, reinforcing the present territorial balance of global politics, while facilitating globalization processes.135 The emergence of the instant juridical regime, discussed here in contemporary globalization conditions involving extensive migration of capital rights, reflects that these expectations do not abide in regard to the movement of peoples.136 Just the reverse, the juridical developments discussed here are best understood, not as articulations of ideal human rights norms, but rather as provisional measures simply aimed at managing the present situation of heightened disorder associated with contemporary globalizing politics in the international realm.

B. From the Borders of the State to those of the Collective

The above understanding of the implications of the current humanitarian rule of law also resonates in some liberal political theorizing, which reflects uncharacteristically chastened expectations. For example, in The Law of Peoples John Rawls offers a plausible standard for global rule of law by presenting a largely positive account of human rights' role in present political realities.137 In The Law of Peoples, Rawlsian human rights operate as a preservative norm, a floor that functions largely to maintain the prevailing values and structure of present international relations.138 Principles of national sovereignty and self-determination in the international realm continue to occupy a central role.139 Also, the uses of "human rights" as the basis for international rule of law are strictly limited to justifying humanitarian intervention as a response to "expansionist" policies—nevertheless the Rawlsian emendation is to conceive of the contemporary understanding of what constitutes "expansionism" to extend within national borders.140 Here again as previously discussed,141 a contemporary version of the historical minorities regimes emerges in the "law of peoples."142 Thus, the relevant protected rights are "peoples' rights"—namely extensions of collective rights to self-determination beyond nationality to

134. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 111 (exhorting globalization as an opportunity for deliberation over social justice).
135. Rights against persecution and ethnic cleansing are "group rights" and implicate property rights, see generally Rawls, supra note 35.
136. Indeed, this understanding builds on traditional definitions of the state in terms of permanence of populations. See Held et al., supra note 3.
137. See Rawls, supra note 35, at 25-30 (proposing a view of justice in the international order conceived in terms of "peoples" rather than "states").
138. Id.
139. Id. (espousing traditional statist views and comparing it to his theory of the "law of peoples").
140. See id. at 37-38.
141. See supra Part III, note 126.
142. For discussion of the interwar minorities' regime, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.

other ascriptive bases, such as ethnicity.143 Protection of these rights is used to justify international intervention.144

Rawls’ positive approach to global rule of law, which draws from present political practices, is a far cry from more aspirational cosmopolitan schemes.145 Although both schemes conceive contemporary human rights in terms of bases that are independent of exclusive state sovereignty, cosmopolitan schemes go much farther in conceptualizing an affirmative constitutive role of human rights operating independent of bases analogous to the principles of state sovereignty and nationality.146

C. Illustrations

This Article has discussed the ways in which the present understanding of international rule of law is now undergoing a paradigm shift. This section addresses how these changes are beginning to influence foreign policy discourse,147 evincing the paradigm shift in the conception of rule of law. Recent foreign policy deliberations reflect varying assumptions about the meaning of international rule of law. The statist view is associated with adherence to longstanding understandings of state sovereignty through the maintenance of international order through the principle of geopolitical stability. In contrast, the new humanitarian standards treat the invocation of the principle of state sovereignty as a rationalization for lawlessness and consider rule of law to depend on the potential of greater international intervention.148 On one hand, humanitarian intervention could be a slippery slope because it threatens the stability of the international order. On the other hand, such intervention is crucial to maintaining rule of law in the international realm. These competing views of rule of law, apparently contradictory and irreconcilable, represent the currently shifting paradigm.

143. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 5-8
144. See supra note 35.
145. For an explanation of what cosmopolitan law entails, see Held et al., supra note 3, at 70-74 (explaining that cosmopolitan law refers to "those elements of law—albeit created by states—which create powers and constraints, and rights and duties, which transcend the claims of nation-states and which have far-reaching national consequences." These elements are meant to define and protect basic human rights values that no political agent should in principle be able to cross). Id. at 70. The cosmopolitan project attempts to specify the principles and the institutional arrangements for making sites and forms of power, which presently operate beyond the scope of democratic control. Id. at 449-50. For examples of the cosmopolitan approach, see Charles R. Betti, Political Theory and International Relations (1990) (advocating a cosmopolitan approach); Stanley Hoffmann et al., The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (1996); Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 751 (1992). See generally Charlotte Breetvelt & Geoffrey Pon-

146. Such as ethnicity, race or religion. See Kingsbury, supra note 123; Schabas, supra note 122.
147. For a discussion of the "legalist" paradigm in foreign relations, see Walker, supra note 70, at 58-62.
148. See generally Beitz, supra note 145.
International deliberations concerning the human rights crises in the former Yugoslavia and Africa illustrate the tragic choices that accompany the rule of law dilemmas. The events in Bosnia and Rwanda were instances of international inaction, despite apparently universally accepted imperatives against gross and systematic rights violations, and thus evident failures of the international legal order. In contrast, although lacking full legality due to the absence of a United Nations mandate, humanitarian actions taken in Kosovo reflected a newly emerging legitimacy. The gap between what traditionally constituted legality in the international legal system, namely protection of national sovereignty and a new understanding of legitimacy, signals the contradictions in the prevailing meaning of rule of law in the international realm.

Recent deliberations by the international community over humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo reflect the expanded role of international law in policy discourse. The relevant policy debates regarding these crises were informed by changing assumptions about the meaning of international rule of law. The crises brought home the extent to which the preexisting international system was inapt to handle post-Cold War dilemmas by underscored the lack of an international military or other alternative enforcement mechanisms and spurred the present momentum for change in the international legal regime in light of the current shift in global power relations.

The dilemmas, chiefly in the Balkans, over humanitarian intervention reflect the contestation over and transformation of the meaning of international rule of law. While the old "Westphalian" political order, rule of law in international affairs was defined largely in terms of state interests in self-determination, in contemporary transforming politics the protection of this norm no longer adequately comprehends the sense of adherence to global rule of law. To the contrary, under the new regime, the primary basis of legality under the prior system, namely penetrating national sovereignty, may well be treated as justified intervention.

Indeed, recent human rights crises illuminate the changing norm regarding the meaning of international rule of law. Under the new humanitarian regime, the relevant policy questions run the gamut from when humanitarian intervention may be justified to when it might be required—law itself is deemed to define the peace. In such a scheme, the international Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia introduced a remarkable aim for international law: advancing the aim of "deterrence" of prospective humanitarian tragedies through international criminal processes as a way to achieve peace and reconciliation of ethnic conflict in the international realm. Standing alone, the notion that international law is the way to peace is not new—indeed this was a traditional belief common to the nineteenth century. However, what is new is the notion that law itself can define what constitutes peace and stability internationally, and further that it could somehow displace policies to resolve international conflict.

The justification for applying international criminal law may constitute a facile extension of domestic criminal legal rationale of deterrence, yet at the international level, the success of these legal mechanisms remains largely unproven. Indeed, heinous massacres continued in the Balkans despite ongoing prosecutions at the ad hoc Yugoslavia Tribunal proceedings. Similar doubts persist about the effects of legal responses related to the Rwandan genocide.


151. This awareness has been underscored post-September 11.


153. See U.N. Charter, art. 2; Walzer, supra note 70.
154. See infra notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
155. See id.
157. See Skeels, supra note 45, at 129 (noting that in the nineteenth century "it was urged not only that international law was a means to peace, but that it was the only road to that end. All other forms of political action not only could be neglected; they were regarded as undesirable."). See Tuck, supra note 75; Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in Kant’s Political Writings 201 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1977).
158. ICC Statute, supra note 18, at Preamble.
159. See Teitel, supra note 47, at 33-39, 49-51. Here the analogy to domestic law is thin. The role of law is not unitary, and its domestic functions are differentiable from its international role.
161. See, e.g., Rwanda Report, supra note 19.
international criminal justice and the advancement of global rule of law.

Finally, there are less transparent dimensions of the new humanitarian discourse, particularly how the new rule of law constitutes both a constraint and an expansion of the exercise of power and, in turn, international relations. The legal developments described above ultimately point to a marked expansion of the law of conflict. Whereas historically international humanitarian law was limited to rationalizing the use of force after the fact, the current expanded regime would come in earlier and potentially play a broader role in policy deliberations. While the new international rule of law does not necessarily reflect a political consensus on humanitarian intervention, the emergent legal regime does lay the basis for its potential uses. The new humanitarian regime manifestly expands upon the historical bases for humanitarian intervention, namely the protection of state self-determination, to include other bases such as the protection of internal minorities. This change subtly shifts the political debate regarding humanitarian rights cases, thus allowing for a growing interventionism. Perhaps, this is to be expected in a globalizing and thus more interconnected international order.

This development was evident in the international relations road from Bosnia to Kosovo. In a report on recent humanitarian crises, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that human rights abuses, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and threats of genocide, constitute legitimate justifications for Security Council intervention under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, he asserted that scope is a leading factor on which to predicate a recommendation of intervention based on breaches of the new humanitarian law. Therefore the broader the bases for adjudicating humanitarian law, the broader the bases for military intervention—one justifies the other. The exploding bullet of the new humanitarian regime is that it ostensibly offers a legal and nonviolent means to uphold the rule of law while also laying a basis for justifying potential military intervention, should the political will for such action emerge. The legalization of NATO intervention in Kosovo illustrates the potential power of the new regime, because there policymaking reflected clashing views of rule of law and thus what may well be perceptibly illegal, was nevertheless legitimate in the public eye.

Conclusion

The new humanitarianism walks a thin line. The emerging legal system is intended to advance the goal of rationalizing foreign policy decision-making and to assist in the legitimization of the new globalizing order. However, the enterprise has troubling ramifications that are not readily transparent. To a large extent, the humanitarian regime aims to ensure minimal prescriptive rights that rationalize the protection of the territorial status quo in contemporary foreign affairs. Beyond the role of the law as constraint, the proposed regime would also authorize the expansion of the bases for military intervention beyond its historical goal of protecting national sovereignty to the broader goal of protecting collectives in ways that are likely to become politicized. Finally, the emergence of an expanded humanitarian regime threatens to erode the human rights discourse and value system, which was formerly an independent perspective that allowed for normative critique of the global rule of law in prevailing political realities.

FOREIGN AFF. 116 (1999); Henkin, supra note 54; Reisman, supra note 13; John Yoo, What’s Wrong with International Law Scholarship? The Dogs That Didn’t Bark: Why Were International Legal Scholars MIA on Kosovo? 1 CRN J. INT’L L. 149 (2000) (arguing this exemplified a politicized rule of law).
