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TELEWIZJA POLSKA USA, INCORPORATED, an Illinois
corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ECHOSTAR SATELLITE CORPORATION,
a Colorado Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 02-4332
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT 69 Fed. Appx. 793; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13624 May
30, 2003, Argued July 7, 2003, Decided
COUNSEL: For TELEWIZJA POLSKA USA, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff -
Appellant: Phillip J. Zisook, DEUTSCH, LEVY & ENGEL, Chicago,
IL USA.
For ECHOSTAR SATELLITE CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellee: Ross
W. Wooten, WELCH & ASSOCIATES, Houston, TX USA.
JUDGES: Before Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Chief Judge, Hon. FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.
OPINION:
ORDER
Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. ("Polska") brought this
action against EchoStar Satellite Corp. ("Echostar"),
alleging violations of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, various
Illinois statutory claims, as well as state common law breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims. EchoStar filed a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted EchoStar's
motion on December 12, 2002. Polska appeals and contends that the
district court misinterpreted the contract between the two parties.
We agree. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this order,
we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case
for proceedings consistent with this order.
A.
Polska is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Illinois; it produces Polish language radio and television
programming. EchoStar is a Colorado corporation with its principal
place of business in Colorado; it broadcasts television and radio
programming via satellite to consumers throughout the United States.
On April 30, 1998, Polska and EchoStar entered into an agreement
by which Polska agreed to provide Polish programming to EchoStar
for broadcast on EchoStar's network. EchoStar was to be responsible
for advertising and selling subscriptions to consumers; the agreement
authorized EchoStar to use Polska's trademarks for this purpose.
Revenue was to be shared between the parties pursuant to a schedule
set forth in the agreement, and EchoStar was required to account
to Polska for the total number of subscribers as of the last day
of the preceding month's billing cycle.
The agreement provided that it would "commence on the
date first written above [April 30, 1998] and shall continue
for three (3) years thereafter [to April 30, 2001.]" R.1-1,
Ex.A at 3, P 2. The agreement was not terminated at an earlier time
by either party, and it therefore expired after three years on April
30, 2001. Paragraph 2 of the agreement entitled, "TERM,"
provided:
Network [Polska] agrees that upon
the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement, if
EchoStar has already launched the Programming Service on its
Satellite, it shall continue to provide EchoStar the Programming
Service under the terms and conditions outlined herein for
a period of time that is the shorter of twelve (12) months
or that number of months necessary for EchoStar to provide the
Programming Service to Service Subscribers who bought a multi-month
subscription to the Programming Service prior to the receipt
by EchoStar of notice of termination of the Agreement. Id. After
the three-year term expired, EchoStar continued to sell new subscriptions
for Polska's programming and to use Polska's trademarks in its marketing
efforts. Polska contends that EchoStar breached the agreement by
continuing to sell subscriptions and by failing to account fully
for or pay Polska for subscriptions sold after April 30, 2001.
The district court found that the language of the contract
was clear and unambiguous. See R.26 at 5. In its view, the contract
provided for a three-year term followed by an additional term of
up to twelve months, during which post termination period "EchoStar's
rights were not limited in anyway [sic] under the Agreement."
Id. The court focused on the contractual language stating that,
during the post termination period, Polska "shall continue
to provide EchoStar with the Programming Service under the
terms and conditions outlined herein." Id. (emphasis
by district court). The district court concluded that this reference
to "terms and conditions" meant all terms and conditions
of the agreement, which included EchoStar's right to "offer
and sell subscriptions to the Programming Service and [to] conduct
customer service functions in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Agreement." Id. (emphasis by district court).
Consequently, the court found no restriction on EchoStar's right
to solicit new subscriptions in the post-termination period. See
id.
The court further reasoned that, if Polska meant to cut off
new subscriptions after three years, it should have narrowed the
language of the contract. See id. at 6. The court therefore granted
EchoStar's motions to dismiss on the breach of contract claim. See
id. Moreover, because it found that the other claims were based
on the breach of contract theory, the court dismissed those claims
as well. See id. at 7-11. Because it agreed with EchoStar's reading
of the contract, the district court had no reason to address Polska's
claim for an accounting and revenues earned during the post-termination
period.
B.
We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir.
2002). Moreover, this is a matter of contract interpretation, which
we review de novo. See Bourke v. Dunn & Bradstreet Corp.,
159 F.3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1998).
The district court held, and EchoStar maintains, that the
contract's terms are "clear and unambiguous," and that
the plain language of the contract permits EchoStar to continue
to sell subscriptions for up to twelve months because these are
the terms and conditions" contemplated in the "Term."
R.26 at 5.
In asking that we reverse that determination, Polska reminds
us that we ought to "construe a contract so that each provision
or clause is given full force and effect and so that the terms make
sense when read together." Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter
Travenol Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1993). Polska
also notes that, under Illinois law, courts must determine the parties'
intent "with reference to the contract as a whole, not merely
by reference to particular words or isolated phrases, but by viewing
each part in light of the others." Id. at 226.
After a review of the entire contact, we respectfully take
a different view than the district court. In our view, when reading
the contract as a whole, it is apparent that the post-termination
period existed to permit the parties to "wind down" their
relationship and to protect pre-existing multi-month subscribers.
See Bourke, 159 F.3d at 1039 ("reference to the purpose
of a contract can be a useful aid in construction"). The disputed
provision states that the post-termination period shall last for
"the shorter of twelve (12) months or that number of months
necessary for EchoStar to provide the Programming Service to Service
Subscribers who bought a multi-month subscription to the Programming
Service prior to the receipt by EchoStar of notice of termination."
R.1-1, Ex.A at 3, P 2. In the context of the entire agreement, the
most natural reading of this clause is that it was intended to ensure
that existing subscribers continued to receive programming for up
to one year, while permitting the parties to terminate their relationship.
The clause that the district court found determinative defined
only Polska's obligation to "continue to provide EchoStar the
Programming Service under the terms and conditions outlined herein."
Id. This reference to "terms and conditions" most naturally
refers to Polska's obligation to provide Programming Service, defined
in Exhibit A to the contract as "a single video Polish language
television channel known as 'TV Polonia' and produced by Telewizja
Polska in Warsaw, Poland, and two Polish language radio channels
known as 'Polish Radio Program 1' and 'Polish Radio Program 3.'"
Id. at 15. Additionally, paragraph 6 of the Agreement outlines the
specific requirements or "terms and conditions" for uplinking
the Program Services to EchoStar's network. See id. at 6-7.
In short, Polska presents the most natural reading of the
contractual provisions as a whole. The Term provision was intended
to protect existing subscribers who had paid for service extending
beyond the expiration of the three-year contractual period. Consequently,
we mut conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Polska's
claims based on the conclusion that there could be no breach of
contract.
C.
Polska also claims that the district court erred by failing
to address Polska's argument that EchoStar did not account for and
share revenue earned in the twelve-month post termination period.
The relevant contract provision addressing Polska's right to a monthly
accounting provides:
4.1 Reports. Within thirty (30)
days after the end of each calendar month during the Term, EchoStar
shall supply to [Polska] the total number of Service Subscribers
as of the last day of the billing cycle for the immediately
preceding month ...
R.1-1, Ex.A at 4, P 4.1. In its amended complaint, Polska's breach
of contract claim alleged:
15. In breach of the Agreement,
EchoStar continued to sell new subscriptions to Polska's programming
and used Polska's trademarks for its own marketing purposes
after the Agreement authorizing such use had terminated.
16. EchoStar has further failed
to account to Polska for the subscriptions it sold or the revenue
it derived from such sales subsequent to April 30, 2001 in violation
of paragraph 4.1 of the Agreement.
R.10 at 8. The district court's order granting EchoStar's motion
to dismiss did not address Polska's claim that EchoStar had failed
to account for and share revenue earned during the post-termination
period.
EchoStar claims that it had no duty to account for "subscriptions
sold or revenue derived" because P 4.1 of the contract only
requires that it account for the total number of subscribers at
the end of each month. It points out that the complaint does not
allege precisely this obligation. EchoStar's position is reminiscent
of the requirements imposed by a strict fact pleading regime; however,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure envision only notice pleading.
The complaint clearly placed EchoStar on notice that Polska alleged
that Echostar had failed to account for subscriptions sold and revenue
earned under the agreement. See Lewis v. Local Union No. 100 of
the Laborers' Int'l Union of N. America, AFL-CIO, 750 F.2d
1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that even vague allegations
not identifying particular theory may set forth a claim for breach
of contract under notice pleading); see also Petri v. Gatlin,
997 F. Supp. 956, 963-65 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting Illinois' fact
pleading requirements in a diversity breach of contract case). n1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - -
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n1 EchoStar also contends that the amended complaint was not
properly filed because Polska did not secure EchoStar's assent to
file or secure leave from the court to file. However, no such leave
was required because EchoStar's Rule 12(b)(6) motion was not a responsive
pleading that triggers the requirement that a party seek leave to
amend. See Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - -
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Alternately, EchoStar argues that Polska waived its right
to an accounting, for it failed to make a timely request under the
contract. The contract provides:
4.3 Audit Rights. No more than
once every twelve (12) months during the Term and on a one-time
basis only for one (1) year thereafter, and upon at least thirty
(30) business days advance written notice, [Polska] shall have the
right, through an independent accounting firm, to perform an audit
at EchoStar's offices, during normal business hours, of the
books and records of EchoStar with respect to the Programming
Service only for the sole purpose of verifying Shared Revenue
payments ...
R.1-1, Ex.A, at 4. Polska requested an audit on April 25, 2002,
five days before the post-termination period ended on April 30,
2002. See R.16, Ex.B. EchoStar claims that, because it was not given
the mandatory thirty business day notice and because the one-year
term expired before thirty days passed, EchoStar has no obligation
to grant Polska an audit. We think that a more natural reading of
the contract requires that EchoStar honor a request for an accounting
made within less than thirty days of the expiration of the one-year
period, with the audit to be conducted after the termination of
the one-year term. Indeed, even absent the contractual provision,
pursuant to P 4.1, EchoStar would be required to account for the
subscriptions that it sold and to share the profits.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this order.
REVERSED and REMANDED
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