TITLE 47. TELEGRAPHS, TELEPHONES, AND RADIOTELEGRAPHS
                      CHAPTER 5. WIRE OR RADIO COMMUNICATION
                                GENERAL PROVISIONS
  
                             47 USCS § 151  (2003)
 
§ 151.  Purposes of Act; Federal Communications Commission created
 
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
 by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people
 of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color,
 religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
 world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at
 reasonable charges, for the purpose of national defense, for the purpose of
 promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio
 communication, and for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of
 this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several
 agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and
 foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is hereby created a
 commission to be known as the "Federal Communications Commission", which shall
 be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the
 provisions of this Act.
 
HISTORY:    (June 19, 1934, ch 652, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064; May 20, 1937,
 ch 229, § 1, 50 Stat. 189; Feb. 8, 1996, P.L. 104-104, Title I, Subtitle A, §
 104, 110 Stat. 86.)
 
                    HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
 References in text:
    "This Act", referred to in this section, is Act June 19, 1934, ch 652,
 popularly known as the Communications Act of 1934, which appears generally as 47
 USCS §§ 151 et seq. For full classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables
 volumes.
 
Effective date of section:
    Act June 19, 1934, ch 652, Title VII [Title VI], § 707 [607], 48 Stat. 1105,
 which appears as 47 USCS § 607, provided that this section is effective July 1,
 1934.
 
Amendments:
    1937. Act May 20, 1937, inserted "for the purpose of promoting safety of life
 and property through the use of wire and radio communication".
    1996. Act Feb. 8, 1996, inserted ", without discrimination on the basis of
 race, color, religion, national origin, or sex,".
 
Other provisions:
    World telecommunications conferences. Act May 13, 1947, ch 51, 61 Stat. 83,
 provided: "Nothing in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended [47 USCS §§ 151
 et seq., generally; for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes], or in
 any other provision of law shall be construed to prohibit United States
 communication common carriers from rendering free communication services to
 official participants in the world telecommunications conferences to be held in
 the United States in 1947, subject to such rules and regulations as the Federal
 Communications Commission may prescribe.".
    Ex. Or. No. 10460. Ex. Or. No. 10460 of June 18, 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 3513; Ex.
 Or. No. 10773 of July 1, 1958, 23 Fed. Reg. 5061; Ex. Or. No. 10782 of Sept. 8,
 1958, 23 Fed. Reg. 6971, formerly classified as a note to this section, was
 revoked by Ex. Or. No. 10995 of Feb. 16, 1962, 27 Fed. Reg. 1519. It related to
 the performance of telecommunications functions by the Director of the Office of
 Civil and Defense Mobilization.
    Commission on Governmental Use of International Telecommunications. Act July
 29, 1954, ch 647, 68 Stat. 587, established the Commission on Governmental Use
 of International Telecommunications to examine, study and report on the
 objectives, operations, and effectiveness of information programs with respect
 to the prompt development of techniques, methods, and programs for greatly
 expanded and far more effective operations in this vital area of foreign policy
 through the use of foreign telecommunications. The Commission was required to
 make a report of its findings and recommendations on or before Dec. 31, 1954,
 and the Commission ceased to exist 90 days after submission of its report to the
 Congress.
    Study of telecommunications and information goals. Act Sept. 13, 1982, P.L.
 97-259, Title II, § 202, 96 Stat. 1099, provides:
    "(a) The National Telecommunications and Information Administration shall
 conduct a comprehensive study of the long-range international
 telecommunications and information goals of the United States, the specific
 international telecommunications and information policies necessary to promote
 those goals and the strategies that will ensure that the United States achieves
 them. The Administration shall further conduct a review of the structures,
 procedures, and mechanisms which are utilized by the United States to develop
 international telecommunications and information policy.
    "(b) In any study or review conducted pursuant to this section, the National
 Telecommunications and Information Administration shall not make public
 information regarding usage or traffic patterns which would damage United States
 commercial interests. Any such study or review shall be limited to international
 telecommunications policies or to domestic telecommunications issues which
 directly affect such policies.".
    Stylistic consistency. Act Feb. 8, 1996, P.L. 104-104, Title I, Subtitle A, §
 101(c), 110 Stat. 79, provides: "The Act [47 USCS § 151 et seq., generally; for
 full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] is amended so that--
    "(1) the designation and heading of each title of the Act shall be in the
 form and typeface of the designation and heading of this title of this Act; and
    "(2) the designation and heading of each part of each title of the Act shall
 be in the form and typeface of the designation and heading of part I of title II
 of the Act [47 USCS §§ 201 et seq.], as amended by subsection (a).".
    Internet Tax Freedom Act. Act Oct. 21, 1998, P.L. 105-277, Div C, Title XI,
 112 Stat. 2681-719; Nov. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-75, § 2, 115 Stat. 703, provides:
    "Sec. 1100. Short title.
    "This title may be cited as the 'Internet Tax Freedom Act'.
    "Sec. 1101. Moratorium.
    "(a) Moratorium. No State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any
 of the following taxes during the period beginning on October 1, 1998, and
 ending on November 1, 2003--
       "(1) taxes on Internet access, unless such tax was generally imposed and
 actually enforced prior to October 1, 1998; and
       "(2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.
    "(b) Preservation of State and local taxing authority.
    "Except as provided in this section, nothing in this title shall be construed
 to modify, impair, or supersede, or authorize the modification, impairment, or
 superseding of, any State or local law pertaining to taxation that is otherwise
 permissible by or under the Constitution of the United States or other Federal
 law and in effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
    "(c) Liabilities and pending cases. Nothing in this title affects liability
 for taxes accrued and enforced before the date of enactment of this Act, nor
 does this title affect ongoing litigation relating to such taxes.
    "(d) Definition of generally imposed and actually enforced. For purposes of
 this section, a tax has been generally imposed and actually enforced prior to
 October 1, 1998, if, before that date, the tax was authorized by statute and
 either--
       "(1) a provider of Internet access services had a reasonable opportunity
 to know by virtue of a rule or other public proclamation made by the appropriate
 administrative agency of the State or political subdivision thereof, that such
 agency has interpreted and applied such tax to Internet access services; or
       "(2) a State or political subdivision thereof generally collected such tax
 on charges for Internet access.
    "(e) Exception to moratorium.
       (1) In general. Subsection (a) shall also not apply in the case of any
 person or entity who knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the
 material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web,
 makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor
 and that includes any material that is harmful to minors unless such person or
 entity has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors--
          "(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access
 code, or adult personal identification number;
          "(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
          "(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available
 technology.
       "(2) Scope of exception. For purposes of paragraph (1), a person shall not
 be considered to making a communication for commercial purposes of material to
 the extent that the person is--
          "(A) a telecommunications carrier engaged in the provision of a
 telecommunications service;
          "(B) a person engaged in the business of providing an Internet access
 service;
          "(C) a person engaged in the business of providing an Internet
 information location tool; or
          "(D) similarly engaged in the transmission, storage, retrieval,
 hosting, formatting, or translation (or any combination thereof) of a
 communication made by another person, without selection or alteration of the
 communication.
       "(3) Definitions. In this subsection:
          "(A) By means of the World Wide Web. The term 'by means of the World
 Wide Web' means by placement of material in a computer server-based file archive
 so that it is publicly accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext transfer
 protocol, file transfer protocol, or other similar protocols.
          "(B) Commercial purposes; engaged in the business.
             (i) Commercial purposes. A person shall be considered to make a
 communication for commercial purposes only if such person is engaged in the
 business of making such communications.
             "(ii) Engaged in the business. The term 'engaged in the business'
 means that the person who makes a communication, or offers to make a
 communication, by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material that
 is harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a
 regular course of such person's trade or business, with the objective of earning
 a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that the
 person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such communications
 be the person's sole or principal business or source of income). A person may be
 considered to be engaged in the business of making, by means of the World Wide
 Web, communications for commercial purposes that include material that is
 harmful to minors, only if the person knowingly causes the material that is
 harmful to minors to be posted on the World Wide Web or knowingly solicits such
 material to be posted on the World Wide Web.
          "(C) Internet. The term 'Internet' means collectively the myriad of
 computer and telecommunications facilities, including equipment and operating
 software, which comprise the interconnected world-wide network of networks that
 employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any predecessor
 or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds
 by wire or radio.
          "(D) Internet access service. The term 'Internet access service' means
 a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or
 other services offered over the Internet and may also include access to
 proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of
 services offered to consumers. Such term does not include
 telecommunications services.
          "(E) Internet information location tool. The term 'Internet information
 location tool' means a service that refers or links users to an online location
 on the World Wide Web. Such term includes directories, indices, references,
 pointers, and hypertext links.
          "(F) Material that is harmful to minors. The term 'material that is
 harmful to minors' means any communication, picture, image, graphic image file,
 article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or
 that--
             "(i) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
 would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is
 designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
             "(ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently
 offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual
 contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
 exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
             "(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
 political, or scientific value for minors.
          "(G) Minor. The term 'minor' means any person under 17 years of age.
          "(H) Telecommunications carrier; telecommunications service. The terms
 'telecommunications carrier' and 'telecommunications service' have the meanings
 given such terms in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153).
    "(f) Additional exception to moratorium.
       (1) In general. Subsection (a) shall also not apply with respect to an
 Internet access provider, unless, at the time of entering into an agreement with
 a customer for the provision of Internet access services, such provider offers
 such customer (either for a fee or at no charge) screening software that is
 designed to permit the customer to limit access to material on the Internet that
 is harmful to minors.
       "(2) Definitions. In this subsection:
          "(A) Internet access provider. The term 'Internet access provider'
 means a person engaged in the business of providing a computer and
 communications facility through which a customer may obtain access to the
 Internet, but does not include a common carrier to the extent that it provides
 only telecommunications services.
          "(B) Internet access services. The term 'Internet access services'
 means the provision of computer and communications services through which a
 customer using a computer and a modem or other communications device may obtain
 access to the Internet, but does not include telecommunications services
 provided by a common carrier.
          "(C) Screening software. The term 'screening software' means software
 that is designed to permit a person to limit access to material on the Internet
 that is harmful to minors.
       "(3) Applicability. Paragraph (1) shall apply to agreements for the
 provision of Internet access services entered into on or after the date that is
 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
    "Sec. 1102. Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce.
    "(a) Establishment of Commission. There is established a commission to be
 known as the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (in this title referred
 to as the 'Commission'). The Commission shall--
       "(1) be composed of 19 members appointed in accordance with subsection
 (b), including the chairperson who shall be selected by the members of the
 Commission from among themselves; and
       "(2) conduct its business in accordance with the provisions of this title.
    "(b) Membership.
       (1) In general. The Commissioners shall serve for the life of the
 Commission. The membership of the Commission shall be as follows:
          "(A) 3 representatives from the Federal Government, comprised of the
 Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States
 Trade Representative (or their respective delegates).
          "(B) 8 representatives from State and local governments (one such
 representative shall be from a State or local government that does not impose a
 sales tax and one representative shall be from a State that does not impose an
 income tax).
          "(C) 8 representatives of the electronic commerce industry (including
 small business), telecommunications carriers, local retail businesses, and
 consumer groups, comprised of--
             "(i) 5 individuals appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate;
             "(ii) 3 individuals appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate;
             "(iii) 5 individuals appointed by the Speaker of the House of
 Representatives; and
             "(iv) 3 individuals appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of
 Representatives.
       "(2) Appointments. Appointments to the Commission shall be made not later
 than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The chairperson shall
 be selected not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       "(3) Vacancies. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers,
 but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
    "(c) Acceptance of gifts and grants. The Commission may accept, use, and
 dispose of gifts or grants of services or property, both real and personal, for
 purposes of aiding or facilitating the work of the Commission. Gifts or grants
 not used at the expiration of the Commission shall be returned to the donor or
 grantor.
    "(d) Other resources. The Commission shall have reasonable access to
 materials, resources, data, and other information from the Department of
 Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of
 the Treasury, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. The
 Commission shall also have reasonable access to use the facilities of any such
 Department or Office for purposes of conducting meetings.
    "(e) Sunset. The Commission shall terminate 18 months after the date of the
 enactment of this Act.
    "(f) Rules of the Commission.
       (1) Quorum. Nine members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for
 conducting the business of the Commission.
       "(2) Meetings. Any meetings held by the Commission shall be duly noticed
 at least 14 days in advance and shall be open to the public.
       "(3) Opportunities to testify. The Commission shall provide opportunities
 for representatives of the general public, taxpayer groups, consumer groups, and
 State and local government officials to testify.
       "(4) Additional rules. The Commission may adopt other rules as needed.
    "(g) Duties of the Commission.
       (1) In general. The Commission shall conduct a thorough study of Federal,
 State and local, and international taxation and tariff treatment of transactions
 using the Internet and Internet access and other comparable intrastate,
 interstate or international sales activities.
       "(2) Issues to be studied. The Commission may include in the study under
 subsection (a)--
          "(A) an examination of--
             "(i) barriers imposed in foreign markets on United States providers
 of property, goods, services, or information engaged in electronic commerce and
 on United States providers of telecommunications services; and
             "(ii) how the imposition of such barriers will affect United States
 consumers, the competitiveness of United States citizens providing property,
 goods, services, or information in foreign markets, and the growth and maturing
 of the Internet;
          "(B) an examination of the collection and administration of consumption
 taxes on electronic commerce in other countries and the United States, and the
 impact of such collection on the global economy, including an examination of the
 relationship between the collection and administration of such taxes when the
 transaction uses the Internet and when it does not;
          "(C) an examination of the impact of the Internet and Internet access
 (particularly voice transmission) on the revenue base for taxes imposed under
 section 4251 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 4251];
          "(D) an examination of model State legislation that--
             "(i) would provide uniform definitions of categories of property,
 goods, service, or information subject to or exempt from sales and use taxes;
 and
             "(ii) would ensure that Internet access services, online services,
 and communications and transactions using the Internet, Internet access service,
 or online services would be treated in a tax and technologically neutral manner
 relative to other forms of remote sales;
          "(E) an examination of the effects of taxation, including the absence
 of taxation, on all interstate sales transactions, including transactions using
 the Internet, on retail businesses and on State and local governments, which
 examination may include a review of the efforts of State and local governments
 to collect sales and use taxes owed on in-State purchases from out-of-State
 sellers; and
          "(F) the examination of ways to simplify Federal and State and local
 taxes imposed on the provision of telecommunications services.
       "(3) Effect on the Communications Act of 1934. Nothing in this section
 shall include an examination of any fees or charges imposed by the Federal
 Communications Commission or States related to--
          "(A) obligations under the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et
 seq.); or
          "(B) the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [Act Feb.
 8, 1996, P.L. 104-104; for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] (or
 of amendments made by that Act).
    "(h) National Tax Association Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax
 Project. The Commission shall, to the extent possible, ensure that its work does
 not undermine the efforts of the National Tax Association Communications and
 Electronic Commerce Tax Project.
    "Sec. 1103. Report.
    "Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
 Commission shall transmit to Congress for its consideration a report reflecting
 the results, including such legislative recommendations as required to address
 the findings of the Commission's study under this title. Any recommendation
 agreed to by the Commission shall be tax and technologically neutral and apply
 to all forms of remote commerce. No finding or recommendation shall be included
 in the report unless agreed to by at least two-thirds of the members of the
 Commission serving at the time the finding or recommendation is made.
    "Sec. 1104. Definitions.
    "For the purposes of this title:
       "(1) Bit tax. The term 'bit tax' means any tax on electronic commerce
 expressly imposed on or measured by the volume of digital information
 transmitted electronically, or the volume of digital information per unit of
 time transmitted electronically, but does not include taxes imposed on the
 provision of telecommunications services.
       "(2) Discriminatory tax. The term 'discriminatory tax' means--
          "(A) any tax imposed by a State or political subdivision thereof on
 electronic commerce that--
             "(i) is not generally imposed and legally collectible by such State
 or such political subdivision on transactions involving similar property, goods,
 services, or information accomplished through other means;
             "(ii) is not generally imposed and legally collectible at the same
 rate by such State or such political subdivision on transactions involving
 similar property, goods, services, or information accomplished through other
 means, unless the rate is lower as part of a phase-out of the tax over not more
 than a 5-year period;
             "(iii) imposes an obligation to collect or pay the tax on a
 different person or entity than in the case of transactions involving similar
 property, goods, services, or information accomplished through other means;
             "(iv) establishes a classification of Internet access service
 providers or online service providers for purposes of establishing a higher tax
 rate to be imposed on such providers than the tax rate generally applied to
 providers of similar information services delivered through other means; or
          "(B) any tax imposed by a State or political subdivision thereof, if--
             "(i) except with respect to a tax (on Internet access) that was
 generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1, 1998, the sole
 ability to access a site on a remote seller's out-of-State computer server is
 considered a factor in determining a remote seller's tax collection obligation;
 or
             "(ii) a provider of Internet access service or online services is
 deemed to be the agent of a remote seller for determining tax collection
 obligations solely as a result of--
                "(I) the display of a remote seller's information or content on
 the out-of-State computer server of a provider of Internet access service or
 online services; or
                "(II) the processing of orders through the out-of-State computer
 server of a provider of Internet access service or online services.
       "(3) Electronic commerce. The term 'electronic commerce' means any
 transaction conducted over the Internet or through Internet access, comprising
 the sale, lease, license, offer, or delivery of property, goods, services, or
 information, whether or not for consideration, and includes the provision of
 Internet access.
       "(4) Internet. The term 'Internet' means collectively the myriad of
 computer and telecommunications facilities, including equipment and operating
 software, which comprise the interconnected world-wide network of networks that
 employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any predecessor
 or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds
 by wire or radio.
       "(5) Internet access. The term 'Internet access' means a service that
 enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services
 offered over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content,
 information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to
 users. Such term does not include telecommunications services.
       "(6) Multiple tax.
          (A) In general. The term 'multiple tax' means any tax that is imposed
 by one State or political subdivision thereof on the same or essentially the
 same electronic commerce that is also subject to another tax imposed by another
 State or political subdivision thereof (whether or not at the same rate or on
 the same basis), without a credit (for example, a resale exemption certificate)
 for taxes paid in other jurisdictions.
          "(B) Exception. Such term shall not include a sales or use tax imposed
 by a State and 1 or more political subdivisions thereof on the same electronic
 commerce or a tax on persons engaged in electronic commerce which also may have
 been subject to a sales or use tax thereon.
          "(C) Sales or use tax. For purposes of subparagraph (B), the term
 'sales or use tax' means a tax that is imposed on or incident to the sale,
 purchase, storage, consumption, distribution, or other use of tangible personal
 property or services as may be defined by laws imposing such tax and which is
 measured by the amount of the sales price or other charge for such property or
 service.
       "(7) State. The term 'State' means any of the several States, the District
 of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
       "(8) Tax.
          (A) In general. The term 'tax' means--
             "(i) any charge imposed by any governmental entity for the purpose
 of generating revenues for governmental purposes, and is not a fee imposed for a
 specific privilege, service, or benefit conferred; or
             "(ii) the imposition on a seller of an obligation to collect and to
 remit to a governmental entity any sales or use tax imposed on a buyer by a
 governmental entity.
          "(B) Exception. Such term does not include any franchise fee or similar
 fee imposed by a State or local franchising authority, pursuant to section 622
 or 653 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 542, 573), or any other fee
 related to obligations or telecommunications carriers under the Communications
 Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.).
       "(9) Telecommunications service. The term 'telecommunications service' has
 the meaning given such term in section 3(46) of the Communications Act of 1934
 (47 U.S.C. 153(46)) and includes communications services (as defined in section
 4251 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 4251]).
       "(10) Tax on internet access. The term 'tax on Internet access' means a
 tax on Internet access, including the enforcement or application of any new or
 preexisting tax on the sale or use of Internet services unless such tax was
 generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1, 1998.".
 
NOTES:
 
                          CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

   Federal Communications Commission--Practice and procedure, 47 CFR Part 1.
    Federal Communications Commission--Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 CFR Part
 11.
    Federal Communications Commission--Jurisdictional separations procedures;
 Standard procedures for separating telecommunications property costs, revenues,
 expenses, taxes and reserves for telecommunications companies, 47 CFR Part 36.
    Federal Communications Commission--Interconnection, 47 CFR Part 51.
    Federal Communications Commission--Numbering, 47 CFR Part 52.
    Federal Communications Commission--Special provisions concerning Bell
 operating companies, 47 CFR Part 53.
    Federal Communications Commission--Tariffs, 47 CFR Part 61.
    Federal Communications Commission--Extension of lines, new lines, and
 discontinuance, reduction, outage and impairment of service by common carriers;
 and grants of recognized private operating agency status, 47 CFR Part 63.
    Federal Communications Commission--Interstate rate of return prescription
 procedures and methodologies, 47 CFR Part 65.
    Federal Communications Commission--Connection of terminal equipment to the
 telephone network, 47 CFR Part 68.
    Federal Communications Commission--Access charges, 47 CFR Part 69.
    Federal Communications Commission--Multichannel video and cable television
 service, 47 CFR Part 76.
    Federal Communications Commission--Cable television relay service, 47 CFR
 Part 78.
    Federal Communications Commission--Closed captioning and video description of
 video programming, 47 CFR Part 79.
    Federal Communications Commission--Stations in the maritime services, 47 CFR
 Part 80.
    Federal Communications Commission--Amateur radio service, 47 CFR Part 97.
 

                               CROSS REFERENCES

   This section is referred to in 47 USCS §§ 225, 309, 332, 607, 925.
 

                                RESEARCH GUIDE

Federal Procedure:
    31 Fed Proc L Ed, Telecommunications §§ 72:1, 3, 6, 244, 321.
 
Am Jur:
    48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 930.
    54 Am Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices §§
 259, 260, 300.
    74 Am Jur 2d, Telecommunications §§ 4, 13, 131, 144.
    83 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning § 7.
 
Forms:
    15A Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Telecommunications (2002) §§ 62:327, 388, 390,
 391, 396, 398.
    17 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Telecommunications § 245:60.
    23A Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Telecommunications §§ 53, 55, 56, 68, 93,
 94, 107-109.
 
Annotations:
    First Amendment guaranty of free speech and press as applied to licensing and
 regulation of broadcast media.  69 L Ed 2d 1110.
    What constitutes change in radio station's program format which is not in
 public interest, or which results in loss to public of distinctive or
 specialized programming, which will cause Federal Communications Commission to
 refuse to renew, transfer, or reassign station's license.  27 ALR Fed 379.
    Effect of broadcaster's employment practices on renewal of broadcaster's
 radio license.  56 ALR Fed 49.
    Effect of broadcaster's employment practices on renewal of broadcaster's
 television license.  57 ALR Fed 16.
    Federal regulation of "teletext" broadcasting.  88 ALR Fed 559.
    Validity and construction of municipal ordinances regulating Community
 Antenna Television Service (CATV).  41 ALR3d 384.
    Community Antenna Television Systems (CATV) as subject to jurisdiction of
 state public utility or service commission.  61 ALR3d 1150.
    Standing to contest award of, or acquisition of right to operate, cable TV
 certificate, license, or franchise in state court action.  78 ALR3d 1255.
 
Law Review Articles:
    Wiley. Procedural accommodation of federal and state regulatory interest in
 cable television.  25 Ad L Rev 213.
    Smith. Practicing Communications Law--The Tangents: The Federal
 Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.  32 Ad L Rev 457,
 Summer 1980.
    Trelease; Swain. Nexus and remote sellers: the taxation of electronic
 commerce.  31 Colo L 75, February 2002.
    Hyde. FCC policy and procedures relating to hearings and broadcast
 applications in which a new applicant seeks to displace a licensee seeking
 renewal.  1975 Duke L J 253.
    Lacey. The electric church: An FCC-"established" institution?  31 Fed Com L J
 235, Spring 1979.
    Geller, Communications law.  63 Geo L J 39.
    Stevens. The Internet and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 35 Harv J on
 Legis 5, Winter 1998.
    Kohn. Cable television: To what extent may the state regulate?  49 Lab Bull
 513.
    Chen. The last picture show (on twilight of federal mass communications
 regulation).  80 Minn L Rev 1415, June 1996.
    Baumol; Merrill. Deregulatory taking, breach of the regulatory contract, and
 the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [Discussion of Deregulatory takings and
 breach of the regulatory contract. J. G. Sidak, D. F. Spulber. 71 N.Y.U.  L.
 Rev. 851-999 Oct. '96], 72 NYU L Rev 1037, November 1997.
    Ward; Sipior. The taxation of e-commerce.  16 Prac Tax Law 23, Fall 2001.
    Canby. The First Amendment and the state as editor: Implications for public
 broadcasting.  52 Tex L Rev 1123.
    Hagelin. The First Amendment stake in new technology: The broadcast-cable
 controversy.  44 U Cin L Rev 427.
    Price. Requiem for the wired nation: Cable rulemaking at the FCC.  61 Va L
 Rev 541.
    Johnson; Dystel. A day in the life: The Federal Communications Commission.
 82 Yale L J 1575.
    Albert. Standing to challenge administrative action.  83 Yale L J 425.
 

                       INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS


I. IN GENERAL
  1. Generally
  2. Purpose
  3. --Protection of public interest
  4. Construction
  5. Relationship with First Amendment
  6. Relationship with other federal statutes
  7. --Antitrust laws
  8. Relationship with state or local laws
  9. --Particular state or local statutes or actions
  10. ----Land use regulation
  11. Availability of private cause of action
  12. Miscellaneous
 
II. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
  13. Generally
  14. FCC authority and jurisdiction
  15. Areas of regulation
  16. --Cable television systems
  17. --Data processing services
  18. --Program content
  19. Enforcement powers
  20. --Antitrust considerations
 
I. IN GENERAL
 
1. Generally
    Federal Communications Act is comprehensive scheme for regulation of
 interstate communications.  Benanti v United States (1957) 355 US 96, 2 L Ed 2d
 126, 78 S Ct 155, 58-1 USTC P 15142, 1 AFTR 2d 2213.
    Enactment of Radio Act of 1927 (44 Stat 1162) and of Federal Communications
 Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) was made necessary by chaos which ensued
 from permitting anyone to use any frequency at whatever power level desired;
 Congress has power to grant and deny broadcasting licenses and to eliminate
 existing stations.  Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC (1969) 395 US 367, 23 L Ed
 2d 371, 89 S Ct 1794, 1 Media L R 2053.
    47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. cover both television and radio.  Allen B. Dumont
 Laboratories, Inc. v Carroll (1950, CA3 Pa) 184 F2d 153, cert den (1951) 340 US
 920, 95 L Ed 670, 71 S Ct 490.
    No language of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq., relating to grants of rights to
 licensees, suggests intent to recognize or to vitalize any common-law rights in
 radio broadcasting or in use of frequencies therefor.  Yankee Network, Inc. v
 FCC (1939) 71 App DC 11, 107 F2d 212.
    47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. contemplate regulation of interstate wire
 communication from its inception to its completion.  United States v American
 Tel. & Tel. Co. (1944, DC NY) 57 F Supp 451, affd (1945) 325 US 837, 89 L Ed
 1964, 65 S Ct 1401.
    Removal was warranted because cellular consumers' claims required resolution
 of substantial questions of federal law under Federal Communications Act of
 1934, 47 USCS § 151 et seq. Pinney v Nokia (In re Wireless Tel. Radio Frequency
 Emissions Prods. Liab. Litig.) (2002, DC Md) 216 F Supp 2d 474.
    United States has power, either alone or in cooperation with other countries,
 to impose conditions upon operation of any wireless telegraph system which
 conveys messages to or from United States.  24 Op Atty Gen 100.
 
2. Purpose
    Main purpose of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. is to extend jurisdiction of existing
 radio commission to embrace telegraph and telephone communications.  Weiss v
 United States (1939) 308 US 321, 84 L Ed 298, 60 S Ct 269.
    With regard to Federal Communications Act of 1934, it is intent of Congress
 to permit private broadcasting to develop within widest journalistic freedom
 consistent with its public obligations; only when interest of public are found
 to outweigh legitimate journalistic interest of broadcasters will government
 power be asserted within framework of Act.  Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v
 Democratic Nat'l Committee (1973) 412 US 94, 36 L Ed 2d 772, 93 S Ct 2080, 1
 Media L R 1855.
    It is purpose of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. to secure use of channels of radio
 communication by private licensees under competitive system, and those licensees
 must be protected in that use, not merely from unlicensed stations and
 unlicensed operators, but from improper activities of licensed stations and
 operators, and from arbitrary action by commission itself in exercise of its
 regulatory power.  Yankee Network, Inc. v FCC (1939) 71 App DC 11, 107 F2d 212.
    Language of 47 USCS § 151 expresses congressional purpose of making
 nationwide communication services generally available; it in no way restricts
 FCC to regulation of public communications to exclusion of public interstate
 communication systems, rather, it sets out congressional intent that interstate
 communications services be available so far as possible, not that they
 necessarily be limited to services that common carriers are willing and able to
 provide.  Re American Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 71 FCC2d 1.
    Major objective of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. is to grant Commission sufficient
 authority to insure that regulatory policies relating to common carrier services
 will be developed and administered in uniform, consistent manner.  Re
 Establishment of Interstate Toll Settlements, FCC 83-180 (Adopted April 27,
 1983).
 
3. --Protection of public interest
    Underlying purpose of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. is to protect public interest in
 communications.  Regents of New Mexico College v Albuquerque Broadcasting Co.
 (1947, CA10 NM) 158 F2d 900.
    There is insufficient evidence to conclude that television network's flat ban
 against programs which are presented for purpose of fostering belief in
 astrology illegally precludes programming which falls within the public
 interest, convenience and necessity.  Mark v FCC (1972, CA1) 468 F2d 266.
    Underlying policy of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. is securing and protection of
 public interest.  WOKO, Inc. v FCC (1939) 71 App DC 228, 109 F2d 665.
    Commission in granting or withholding of permits to operate radio station
 should be guided by public convenience, interest, or necessity, as such factors
 are touchstone for authority vested in commission to regulate industry.
 Mansfield Journal Co. (FM) v Federal Communications Com. (1950, App DC) 86 US
 App DC 102, 180 F2d 28.
    47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. do not essay to regulate business of licensee, but
 field of radio broadcasting is open to anyone, provided there be available
 frequency over which he can broadcast without interference to others, if he
 shows his competency, adequacy of his equipment and financial ability to make
 good use of assigned channel.  Federal Communications Com. v Stahlman (1941, DC
 Dist Col) 40 F Supp 338, affd (1942, App DC) 75 US App DC 176, 126 F2d 124.
    No new private rights were created by 47 USCS §§ 159 et seq., the purpose
 being protection of public interest in communications.  Nelson v Leighton (1949,
 DC NY) 82 F Supp 661.
 
4. Construction
    Federal Communications Act must be read as whole and with appreciation of
 responsibilities of body charged with its fair and efficient operation.  United
 States v Storer Broadcasting Co. (1956) 351 US 192, 100 L Ed 1081, 76 S Ct 763,
 1 Media L R 1983.
    In interpreting 47 USCS §§ 151 and 152, United States Supreme Court will be
 guided by rule of statutory construction that, where possible, provisions of
 statute should be read so as not to create conflict.  Louisiana Public Service
 Com. v FCC (1986) 476 US 355, 90 L Ed 2d 369, 106 S Ct 1890.
    Phrase "so far as possible" as contained in 47 USCS § 151 expresses intent
 that available and feasible new technology be applied in achieving mandated
 goal.  United States v Western Electric Co. (1981, DC NJ) 531 F Supp 894, 1981-2
 CCH Trade Cases P 64275.
    District court denied cities' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
 communications service provider's claim that Federal Telecommunications Act of
 1996, 47 USCS § 151 et seq., prevented cities from charging for public
 right-of-ways where motion was based in part on doctrine of judicial estoppel,
 but cities failed to address each of judicial estoppel elements and determining
 whether positions taken by communications service provider in cases cited by
 cities were inconsistent with its positions in current case required court to go
 beyond scope of complaint and motion to dismiss. Qwest Corp. v City of Globe
 (2002, DC Ariz) 237 F Supp 2d 1115.
 
5. Relationship with First Amendment
    Legislative history of Federal Communications Act, both prior to its first
 enactment in 1927 and subsequently, shows deep hostility to censorship either by
 Federal Communications Commission or by broadcast licensee.  Farmers Educational
 & Cooperative Union v WDAY, Inc. (1959) 360 US 525, 3 L Ed 2d 1407, 79 S Ct
 1302.
    It is within Federal Communications Commission's discretion to construe
 Federal Communications Act of 1934 so as to avoid sacrificing First Amendment
 protections for speculative gain; no one has First Amendment right to receive
 license or to monopolize radio frequency and to deny station license because
 public interest requires it is not denial of free speech; broadcasters are not
 without protection under First Amendment, however, it is right of viewers and
 listeners, not rights of broadcasters, which are paramount.  Columbia
 Broadcasting System, Inc. v Democratic Nat'l Committee (1973) 412 US 94, 36 L Ed
 2d 772, 93 S Ct 2080, 1 Media L R 1855.
    "Public interest" standard of Federal Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§
 151 et seq.), governing broadcasters, necessarily invites reference to First
 Amendment principles, and, in particular, to First Amendment goal of achieving
 widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
 sources; however, there is no unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
 comparable to right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.  FCC v
 National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (1978) 436 US 775, 56 L Ed 2d 697,
 98 S Ct 2096, 3 Media L R 2409.
    First Amendment has special meaning in broadcasting context and of all forms
 of communication, broadcasting receives most limited First Amendment protection.
 FCC v Pacifica Foundation (1978) 438 US 726, 57 L Ed 2d 1073, 98 S Ct 3026, 3
 Media L R 2553, reh den (1978) 439 US 883, 58 L Ed 2d 198, 99 S Ct 227 and
 (criticized in ACLU v Reno (1996, ED Pa) 929 F Supp 824).
    A nonprofit religious organization, as licensee of radio station, must
 conform to its "public interest" mandate in employment and other practices in
 connection with broadcast activities; First Amendment guarantees of free speech
 and freedom of religion do not stretch to cover discrimination otherwise
 forbidden under federal law, and 47 USCS § 151 et seq. require that general
 public interest be primary consideration in all but the most strictly religious
 activities.  King's Garden, Inc. v Federal Communications Com. (1974, App DC)
 162 US App DC 100, 498 F2d 51, 7 BNA FEP Cas 1083, 7 CCH EPD P 9315, cert den
 (1974) 419 US 996, 42 L Ed 2d 269, 95 S Ct 309, 8 BNA FEP Cas 1028, 8 CCH EPD P
 9760.
    47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. do not give anyone right to broadcast even though
 radio station enters into contract for broadcast; refusal of permission to
 broadcast sermon on Easter Sunday for reason that it was objectionable and not
 in public interest since of views on Resurrection were to be expressed is not
 federal question so as to give federal court jurisdiction.  Massachusetts
 Universalist Convention v Hildreth & Rogers Co. (1949, DC Mass) 87 F Supp 822,
 affd (1950, CA1 Mass) 183 F2d 497.
    Network is not required to sell commercial time to persons wishing to discuss
 controversial issues, and act does not provide for private cause of action in
 favor of person seeking such access.  Rokus v American Broadcasting Co. (1984,
 SD NY) 616 F Supp 110.
 
6. Relationship with other federal statutes
    Federal Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) does not confer
 any rights on federally licensed amateur or "ham" radio enthusiast which are
 enforceable through 42 USCS § 1983. Howard v Burlingame (1991, CA9 Cal) 937 F2d
 1376, 91 Daily Journal DAR 7170 (criticized in Marchand v Town of Hudson (2001,
 NH) 788 A2d 250).
    Provisions of Radio Act of 1927 were repealed or superseded by Act of June
 19, 1934, creating federal communications commission.  Bamberger Broadcasting
 Service, Inc. v Orloff (1942, DC NY) 44 F Supp 904, 53 USPQ 228.
    Consumers of long distance telephone services cannot bring actions against
 providers of such services under either federal common law or Racketeer
 Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 USCS §§ 1961 et seq.) arising out
 of alleged improper conduct of defendants in charging consumers for long
 distance calls which were never completed, and with failing to advise consumers
 of such practice, since central issue is whether defendants' conduct is
 "reasonable" under federal Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.), and
 since FCC must first make this determination before any liability on part of
 defendants can be established.  In re Long Distance Telecommunication Litig.
 (1985, ED Mich) 612 F Supp 892, affd in part and vacated in part on other
 grounds, revd in part on other grounds, remanded (1987, CA6 Mich) 831 F2d 627.
    Where Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq., provided
 comprehensive scheme to company to redress county's alleged wrongdoing,
 concurrent action under 42 USCS § 1983, which would have allowed award of
 attorney's fees, was unavailable. CIS Communs., L.L.C. v County of Jefferson
 (2002, ED Mo) 222 F Supp 2d 1148.
    District court denied cities' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
 communications service provider's claim that Federal Telecommunications Act of
 1996, 47 USCS § 151 et seq., prevented cities from charging for use of public
 right-of-ways where motion was based in part on 28 USCS § 1341, jurisdictional
 bar of Tax Anti-Injunction Act, and parties agreed on test to determine whether
 charges were taxes under that Act, but it was not clear from information in
 complaint and motion how that test applied to facts. Qwest Corp. v City of Globe
 (2002, DC Ariz) 237 F Supp 2d 1115.
    District court denied cities' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
 communications service provider's 42 USCS § 1983 claim that cities violated
 Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FTA), 47 USCS § 151 et seq., by charging
 for public right-of-ways where parties appeared to agree that provider was not
 new entrant into market, but court did not have fully developed record regarding
 provider's exact status in each of cities, and was thereby prevented from
 concluding that provider was not intended beneficiary of FTA. Qwest Corp. v City
 of Globe (2002, DC Ariz) 237 F Supp 2d 1115.
    Congress did not withdraw Tucker Act (28 USCS § 1491) jurisdiction of Court
 of Federal Claims to hear Fifth Amendment takings claims arising under
 Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.). Qwest Corp. v United
 States (2001) 48 Fed Cl 672.
 
7. --Antitrust laws
    While Federal Communications Commission does not have power to enforce
 antitrust laws as such, it is permitted to take antitrust policies into account
 in making licensing decisions pursuant to "public interest" standard of Federal
 Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) governing broadcasters.  FCC
 v National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (1978) 436 US 775, 56 L Ed 2d
 697, 98 S Ct 2096, 3 Media L R 2409.
    Neither FCC nor state regulatory schemes provide basis for exemption from
 federal antitrust laws.  Essential Communications Systems, Inc. v American Tel.
 & Tel. Co. (1979, CA3 NJ) 610 F2d 1114, 1979-2 CCH Trade Cases P 62978.
    Congress, in enacting Communications Act, did not intend to grant antitrust
 immunity to telephone carriers with respect to alleged anticompetitive conduct.
 Macom Products Corp. v American Tel. & Tel. Co. (1973, CD Cal) 359 F Supp 973,
 1973-2 CCH Trade Cases P 74598.
    Communications Act neither expressly nor impliedly repeals antitrust laws;
 congressional authorization for Commission to regulate
 telecommunications industry does not support conclusion that Congress intended
 to place exclusive jurisdiction over industry conduct in Commission nor grant
 total blanket immunity to industry from application of antitrust laws.  United
 States v American Tel. & Tel. Co. (1976, DC Dist Col) 427 F Supp 57, 1976-2 CCH
 Trade Cases P 61163.
    Interconnection and rate tariff regulation does not, in and of itself,
 foreclose application of antitrust laws.  Jarvis, Inc. v American Tel. & Tel.
 Co. (1978, DC Dist Col) 481 F Supp 120, 1978-2 CCH Trade Cases P 62197.
    Where judicial decree in telephone company antitrust action requires
 operating phone companies to grant nondiscriminatory exchange access to all
 interexchange carriers, operating company's assertions of authority to refuse to
 grant access to its lines to competitor is inconsistent not only with decree
 under antitrust laws but also with Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.);
 operating company cannot evade responsibility under decree by expedient of
 seeking, awaiting, or relying on "instruction" from state regulatory commission,
 since no such body can issue orders or directions which would interfere with
 judicial decree.  United States v Western Elec. Co. (1984, DC Dist Col) 583 F
 Supp 1257, 1984-1 CCH Trade Cases P 65938.
    In its suit under federal antitrust law, competitive local exchange carrier
 (CLEC) alleged that incumbent local exchange carrier engaged in exclusionary
 conduct through denial or delay of access to its local network in areas of
 collocation, access to loops, adequate operations support systems, transport
 services, and line sharing; court found that CLEC's allegations pertaining to
 Telecommunciations Act of 1996, 47 USCS § 151 et seq., duties did not constitute
 exclusionary conduct as matter of antitrust law. Covad Communs. Co. v Bell Atl.
 Corp. (2002, DC Dist Col) 201 F Supp 2d 123.
 
8. Relationship with state or local laws
    47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. not only establishes dual state and federal regulation
 of telephone services, but also recognizes that jurisdictional tensions may
 arise, where 47 USCS § 410 establishes process designed to determine what
 portion of asset is employed to produce or deliver interstate service as opposed
 to intrastate service.  Louisiana Public Service Com. v FCC (1986) 476 US 355,
 90 L Ed 2d 369, 106 S Ct 1890.
    Telegraph companies engaged in sending interstate messages are completely
 under federal control, and messages are sent with consequences and subject to
 conditions affixed by federal law.  Newfield v Ryan (1937, CA5 Fla) 91 F2d 700,
 cert den (1937) 302 US 729, 82 L Ed 563, 58 S Ct 54, reh den (1937) 302 US 650,
 82 L Ed 504, 58 S Ct 137 and reh den (1937) 302 US 777, 82 L Ed 601, 58 S Ct
 138.
    Radio broadcasting company engages in interstate commerce and is subject to
 regulation by 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq and not by state laws attempting to regulate
 radio broadcasting.  National Broadcasting Co. v Board of Public Utility Comm'rs
 (1938, DC NJ) 25 F Supp 761.
    Where judicial decree in telephone company antitrust action requires
 operating phone companies to grant nondiscriminatory exchange access to all
 interexchange carriers, operating company's assertions of authority to refuse to
 grant access to its lines to competitor is inconsistent not only with decree
 under antitrust laws but also with Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.);
 operating company cannot evade responsibility under decree by expedient of
 seeking, awaiting, or relying on "instruction" from state regulatory commission,
 since no such body can issue orders or directions which would interfere with
 judicial decree.  United States v Western Elec. Co. (1984, DC Dist Col) 583 F
 Supp 1257, 1984-1 CCH Trade Cases P 65938.
    It is intent of Congress that federal communications commission should have
 sole authority in granting or refusing application of telegraph company to
 reduce or change type of service rendered by local office, agency or facility,
 where such office, agency or facility constitutes inseparable unit engaged in
 both interstate and intrastate wire communication.  Western Union Tel. Co. v
 State (1951) 207 Ga 675, 63 SE2d 878.
    Congress has so far occupied entire field of interstate business of telegraph
 companies as to exclude state action on subject not expressly excepted and
 purpose of federal occupation of field is to insure uniformity of regulation.
 Western Union Tel. Co. v King (1940) 61 Ga App 537, 6 SE2d 368.
    Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) covers whole field of
 interstate communication by telegraph, and supersedes state statutes so far as
 such communication is concerned.  McCollum v Western Union Tel. Co. (1943) 180
 Tenn 403, 175 SW2d 544.
 
9. --Particular state or local statutes or actions
    Common law nuisance action in which plaintiffs alleged that defendants' radio
 signals interfered with various home electronic equipment must be dismissed for
 failure to state claim since Federal Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151
 et seq.) was intended to preempt such claims.  Broyde v Gotham Tower (1994, CA6
 Mich) 13 F3d 994, 28 FR Serv 3d 227, 1994 FED App 7P, cert den (1994) 511 US
 1128, 128 L Ed 2d 866, 114 S Ct 2137.
    Under 47 USCS § 151 Congress entered field with plain purpose of remedying
 evils attendant upon discrimination and general lack of uniformity, and by so
 doing, it undertook to occupy whole field: even if it be assumed that recovery
 may be had under Tennessee rule for mental anguish unaccompanied by other
 injury, such law or rule has no controlling effect, as federal statute occupies
 field, and brings all interstate communications under its coverage to exclusion
 of local statutes or decisions.  Vaigneur v Western Union Tel. Co. (1940, DC
 Tenn) 34 F Supp 92.
    Since jurisdiction over pay cable television rate is reasonably ancillary to
 the effective performance of the Federal Communications Commission's various
 responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting, the Commission
 may preempt a state from controlling pay cable television rates.  Brookhaven
 Cable TV, Inc. v Kelly (1977, ND NY) 428 F Supp 1216, 2 Media L R 1755, affd
 (1978, CA2 NY) 573 F2d 765, 3 Media L R 2226, cert den (1979) 441 US 904, 60 L
 Ed 2d 372, 99 S Ct 1991, 4 Media L R 2535.
    Removal under 28 USCS § 1441(b) is proper in customer's state claims for
 breach of contract and fraud against long distance telecommunications services
 arising from charging and retaining funds from uncompleted calls because Federal
 Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) preempts state law claims and
 affords complete remedy.  In re Long Distance Telecommunications Litigation
 (1986, ED Mich) 640 F Supp 997, dismd (1986, ED Mich) 647 F Supp 78.
    Federal law must apply to personal injury claim based on delay of telegraph
 company's transmission of international money order to Philippines, because
 broad scheme of Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) indicates Congress's
 intent to occupy field to exclusion of state law, and stated purpose of Act at §
 151 is to make rapid, efficient worldwide communications service with adequate
 facilities available to people of U.S. at reasonable prices.  McDermott v
 Western Union Tel. Co. (1990, ED Cal) 746 F Supp 1016.
    Telephone company is denied summary judgment in its favor on basis of
 Supremacy Clause, even though ordinances charging company high price for
 allowing it to run cable through cities is obstacle to 47 USCS § 151 goal to
 promote "rapid, efficient, nationwide and worldwide wire and radio communication
 with adequate facilities at reasonable charges," because company has not
 established that cities have incurred little or no expense associated with cable
 or that fees charged bear no reasonable relationship to costs incurred. City of
 Shawnee v AT & T Corp. (1995, DC Kan) 910 F Supp 1546.
    In Communications Act, Congress did not intend to completely preempt state
 law claims for fraud, misrepresentation and violations of state consumer
 protection statutes. Weinberg v Sprint Corp. (1996, DC NJ) 165 FRD 431, app
 dismd (1996, DC NJ) 1996 US Dist LEXIS 22512.
    Claims by subscribers of telecommunications company's long distance telephone
 service under state's Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act were
 not pre-empted by Federal Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.), since
 state law claims do not seek to regulate manner in which defendant provides
 communication services to public, rather, they seek to regulate defendant's
 advertising practices in solicitation of customers.  Kellerman v MCI
 Telecommunications Corp. (1985, 1st Dist) 134 Ill App 3d 71, 89 Ill Dec 51, 479
 NE2d 1057, affd (1986) 112 Ill 2d 428, 98 Ill Dec 24, 493 NE2d 1045, cert den
 (1986) 479 US 949, 93 L Ed 2d 384, 107 S Ct 434.
    Federal Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) preempts plaintiffs'
 claim that broadcasting companies' radio transmissions constitute actionable
 nuisance by distorting plaintiffs' reception of other desired radio signals.
 Blackburn v Doubleday Broadcasting Co. (1984, Minn) 353 NW2d 550.
    State legislature has power to enact state legislation relating to curbing
 use of telephone and telegraph wires in furtherance of gambling, regardless of
 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.  McInerney v Ervin (1950, Fla) 46 So 2d 458.
    State statute which prohibits equipping motor vehicle with radio receiving
 set that will receive police signals, is not pre-empted by federal legislation
 in regard to prohibition of radar detectors.  People v Gilbert (1979) 88 Mich
 App 764, 279 NW2d 546.
 
10. ----Land use regulation
    State zoning height limits on amateur radio antenna towers in residential
 areas are not pre-empted by federal law either on grounds of federal
 encouragement of amateur radio or by broad federal scheme regulating radio and
 telecommunications through FCC, including responsibility to license amateur
 radio operators.  Guschke v Oklahoma City (1985, CA10 Okla) 763 F2d 379.
    There is no private right of action under Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151
 et seq.).  Brafman v National Broadcasting Co. (1980, SD NY) 6 Media L R 1189.
    Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) does not preempt home
 association's threatened judicial enforcement of restrictive covenant barring
 homeowners from erecting television receiving antennae or devices, where
 homeowner has failed to allege state or local law or ordinance, or, at minimum,
 some equivalent state action.  Ross v Hatfield (1986, DC Kan) 640 F Supp 708.
    Suit seeking to set aside town planning board's grant of special permit for
 construction of telecommunications relay tower is preempted, where complaint
 seeks annulment of board decision made pursuant to this court's prior judgment
 that permit must issue in accordance with Telecommunications Act (47 USCS §§ 151
 et seq.), even though board did not follow full panoply of procedures provided
 for in Massachusetts zoning law, because judgment grounded in federal law cannot
 be annulled under state zoning ordinance. Chief Justice Cushing Highway Corp. v
 Limbacher (2001, DC Mass) 145 F Supp 2d 108.
    Communications Act (47 USCS § 151 et seq.) does not purport to regulate
 manner in which physical structure involved in radio transmission has impact
 upon local land use considerations.  Sleeper v Old King's Highway Regional
 Historic Dist. Com. (1981) 11 Mass App 571, 417 NE2d 987.
    There is sufficient local interest in regulating antenna height to sustain
 local land use regulation, and federal regulation of radio transmission under 47
 USCS §§ 151 et seq. does not preclude or pre-empt state regulation in that area.
 Schroeder v Municipal Court (1977, 2nd Dist) 73 Cal App 3d 841, 141 Cal Rptr 85,
 app dismd (1978) 435 US 990, 56 L Ed 2d 81, 98 S Ct 1641 and (superseded by
 statute in part as stated in Hunter v City of Whittier (1989, 2nd Dist) 209 Cal
 App 3d 588, 257 Cal Rptr 559).
 
11. Availability of private cause of action
    No new private rights were created by 47 USCS §§ 159 et seq., the purpose
 being protection of public interest in communications.  Nelson v Leighton (1949,
 DC NY) 82 F Supp 661.
    In order to insure that FCC, through its discretion and expertise, will be
 able to foster beneficial and proper interpretations of applications of 47 USCS
 §§ 151 et seq., §§ 151 et seq. are generally viewed as not having created
 implied private rights of action either for damages, or for injunctive relief.
 New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v Public Utilities Com. (1983, DC Me) 565 F Supp
 949.
    Network is not required to sell commercial time to persons wishing to discuss
 controversial issues, and act does not provide for private cause of action in
 favor of person seeking such access.  Rokus v American Broadcasting Co. (1984,
 SD NY) 616 F Supp 110.
    Consumers of long distance telephone services cannot bring actions against
 providers of such services under either federal common law or Racketeer
 Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 USCS §§ 1961 et seq.) arising out
 of alleged improper conduct of defendants in charging consumers for long
 distance calls which were never completed, and with failing to advise consumers
 of such practice, since central issue is whether defendants' conduct is
 "reasonable" under federal Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.), and
 since FCC must first make this determination before any liability on part of
 defendants can be established.  In re Long Distance Telecommunication Litig.
 (1985, ED Mich) 612 F Supp 892, affd in part and vacated in part on other
 grounds, revd in part on other grounds, remanded (1987, CA6 Mich) 831 F2d 627.
 
12. Miscellaneous
    Telecommunications facilities-based carrier cannot unilaterally amend terms
 of its contract with customer engaged in travel-related
 telecommunication services, where FCC has in recent years introduced contract
 carriage regime under Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) in order to
 streamline regulations governing commercial behavior in
 telecommunications sector and to increase level of competition in sale of
 telecommunications services, because doctrine disallowing unilateral amendments
 to private agreements between common carriers and customers filed as contract
 tariffs will validate those agreements in face of attempts to avoid their terms.
 Global Access v AT&T Corp. (1997, SD Fla) 978 F Supp 1068, 11 FLW Fed D 212.
    Plaintiffs' motion to remand their "slamming" action to state court was
 granted because Federal Communications Act, 47 USCS § 151 et seq., was not
 exclusive remedy for unlawful practices such as unauthorized switching of
 customer's long distance service. Sapp v AT&T Corp. (2002, MD Ala) 215 F Supp 2d
 1273.
 
II. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
 
13. Generally
    Main function of Federal Communications Commission is to safeguard public
 interest in broadcasting activities of members of the industry.  National Cable
 Television Asso. v United States (1974) 415 US 336, 39 L Ed 2d 370, 94 S Ct
 1146.
    In customer's action against long distance carrier claiming unlawful price
 discrimination and violation of published tariffs, pursuant to Communications
 Act of 1934, 47 USCS § 151 et seq., Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
 regulated charges for interstate telephone calls through tariff system; once
 tariff was approved by FCC, it carried force of law and was binding on both
 carrier and subscriber. Panatronic USA v AT&T Corp. (2002, CA9 Cal) 287 F3d 840,
 2002 CDOS 3438, 2002-1 CCH Trade Cases P 73648.
 
14. FCC authority and jurisdiction
    Under Federal Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.), Federal
 Communications Commission has power of ruling on facts and policies in first
 instance.  FCC v Allentown Broadcasting Corp. (1955) 349 US 358, 99 L Ed 1147,
 75 S Ct 855.
    Federal Communications Commission under Federal Communications Act of 1934
 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) is given comprehensive mandate, with not niggardly but
 expansive powers.  United States v Southwestern Cable Co. (1968) 392 US 157, 20
 L Ed 2d 1001, 88 S Ct 1994, 1 Media L R 2247.
    The enabling legislation granting power to the Federal Communications
 Commission is designed to be flexible enough to allow consideration and
 administrative direction into areas unforeseen at the time of the enactment.
 General Tel Co. v United States (1971, CA5) 449 F2d 846 (criticized in Gulf
 Power Co. v United States (1998, ND Fla) 998 F Supp 1386).
    Congress, rather than purporting to transfer its legislative power to
 unbounded discretion of regulatory body, intended specific statutory basis for
 FCC's authority.  American Tel. & Tel. Co. v FCC (1973, CA2) 487 F2d 865.
    Although where Commission interprets 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. so as to find
 sufficient legal authority to act, court may give due consideration to
 Commission's interpretation, but court cannot relinquish it's duty to conduct
 independent analysis.  Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v FCC
 (1983, App DC) 228 US App DC 8, 707 F2d 1413.
    In determining mandate of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq., Court of Appeals must focus
 on language of Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) itself, with due
 deference to Commission's interpretation of its own organic law; subject to
 review, FCC is entitled to reconsider and revise its views as to public interest
 and means needed to protect that interest, though it must give sufficient
 explanation of that change.  Black Citizens for a Fair Media v FCC (1983, App
 DC) 231 US App DC 163, 719 F2d 407, cert den (1984) 467 US 1255, 82 L Ed 2d 848,
 104 S Ct 3545.
    Public interest touchstone of Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.)
 permits FCC to allow marketplace to substitute for direct Commission regulation
 in appropriate circumstances.  Wold Communications, Inc. v FCC (1984, App DC)
 237 US App DC 29, 735 F2d 1465.
    Purely intrastate facilities and services used to complete even single
 interstate call can become subject to FCC regulation to extent of interstate
 use.  National Asso. of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v FCC (1984, App DC) 241 US
 App DC 175, 746 F2d 1492.
    Waiver of defects in application for radio channel license was well within
 Commission's authority where Commission had ample reason to believe that waiver
 was necessary to protect public safety, since communications for emergency
 services would be jeopardized in absence of waiver. Keller Communs. v FCC (1997,
 App DC) 327 US App DC 280, 130 F3d 1073, cert den (1998) 524 US 954, 141 L Ed 2d
 740, 118 S Ct 2372.
    Telephone company engaged in interstate or foreign communication solely
 through another corporation is subject to jurisdiction of commission where 67
 per cent of its stock, including 33.5 per cent of common stock, is owned by such
 other corporation, and all matters other than routine management require
 affirmative vote of 80 per cent of common stock.  Rochester Tel. Corp. v United
 States (1938, DC NY) 23 F Supp 634, affd (1939) 307 US 125, 83 L Ed 1147, 59 S
 Ct 754.
    Referral to Federal Communications Commission of suit by interstate
 communications carriers seeking injunctive and declaratory relief concerning
 state regulation of intrastate service was appropriate under doctrine of primary
 jurisdiction; court's jurisdiction was not ousted but merely postponed.  GTE
 Sprint Communications Corp. v Downey (1986, DC Conn) 628 F Supp 193.
    Application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction is inappropriate, where
 action was brought against telephone company alleging discrimination under
 Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.), because plaintiff's claims
 lie within conventional experience of judges.  National Communs. Ass'n v AT&T
 (1993, SD NY) 820 F Supp 139, 1993-2 CCH Trade Cases P 70300, motions ruled upon
 (1998, SD NY) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 3198.
    Jurisdiction of FCC encompasses all forms of electronic communications, not
 merely traditional forms such as telegrams and, therefore, FCC has jurisdiction
 over all forms of electric communications and their physical delivery so that US
 Postal Service is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over physical delivery
 of electronic communications.  Re US Postal Service (1979) 71 FCC2d 100.
    FCC's authority to declare paramount federal authority over interstate
 communications is not affected by whether subject of petition for declaratory
 ruling is state statute or some other type of state action; thus, FCC has
 authority to determine that Tennessee statute (which seeks broadly to establish
 terms and conditions under which interstate operator services (OSPs) may be
 offered in states by establishing specific requirements for OSPs before they
 complete interstate calls) may not apply to interstate OSPs.  Re Operator
 Services Providers of America, FCC FCC91-185 (adopted 6/13/91).
    FCC, in absence of specific statutory provisions, has authority to require
 concerted action on part of private entities subject to its regulatory authority
 if concerted action is necessary or appropriate to further statutory goals and
 functions of FCC.  Re MTS & WATS Market Structure, FCC 83-178 (Adopted Apr. 27,
 1983).
 
15. Areas of regulation
    Devotion of cable television systems to broadcast transmission--together with
 interdependencies between that service and cablecasts, and necessity for unified
 regulation--suffices to bring cablecasts within jurisdiction of the Federal
 Communications Commission.  United States v Midwest Video Corp. (1972) 406 US
 649, 32 L Ed 2d 390, 92 S Ct 1860, reh den (1972) 409 US 898, 34 L Ed 2d 157, 93
 S Ct 95 and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Cable
 Television Ass'n v Finneran (1992, CA2 NY) 954 F2d 91, 19 Media L R 2043).
    Intrastate CATV companies who may receive signals from a local transmission
 point, but who transmit network programming, are subject to interstate
 regulations by the FCC.  General Tel Co. v United States (1971, CA5) 449 F2d 846
 (criticized in Gulf Power Co. v United States (1998, ND Fla) 998 F Supp 1386).
    Federal Communications Commission may preempt state regulation of master
 antenna system which deliver converted and decoded multipoint distribution
 service television signals, and is not invalid because of FCC failure to
 directly impose its own regulations.  New York State Com. on Cable Television v
 FCC (1982, CA2) 669 F2d 58, 7 Media L R 2562.
    Purposes of creation of federal communications commission, as expressed by
 Congress in statute, and mandates pursuant to such purposes, enumerated in
 statute, furnish ample support for commission's adoption of nation-wide
 television allocation plan.  Peoples Broadcasting Co. v United States (1953, App
 DC) 93 US App DC 78, 209 F2d 286.
    Because CPE is now available in increasingly competitive market which
 indicates that CPE will be available at reasonable prices, Commission is
 warranted in finding that provision of CPE is not itself common carrier activity
 within scope of its regulation and that Commission regulation of charges for
 carrier-provided CPE is not necessary to protect public interest; instead of
 regulating charges for CPE, Commission is warranted, as in case of enhanced
 services, in exercising its ancillary jurisdiction to forbid carriers from
 offering CPE as part of transmission service and to require carrier to provide
 CPE only through separate subsidiary.  Computer & Communications Industry Asso.
 v FCC (1982, App DC) 224 US App DC 83, 693 F2d 198, 8 Media L R 2457, cert den
 (1983) 461 US 938, 77 L Ed 2d 313, 103 S Ct 2109.
    FCC acted within its statutory authority in authorizing sale of certain
 discrete transponders on noncommon carrier basis, rather than authorizing prior
 practice under which domestic satellite operators leased transponders on common
 carrier basis in accordance with "just and reasonable" tariff strictures of
 Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.), since (1) under order, each
 applicant is required to satisfy Commission that proposed sales are in public
 interest, (2) satellite operators remain fully subject to Commission's licensing
 authority and (3) Commission stands ready to alter its course if future
 developments indicate that public interest will not be advanced by decision.
 Wold Communications, Inc. v FCC (1984, App DC) 237 US App DC 29, 735 F2d 1465.
    FCC has authority under Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) to
 regulate use of intrastate Wide Area Telecommunications Services (WATS), even
 when that service is used as part of interstate communications network; and thus
 Commission did not abuse its authority in prohibiting restrictions on resale and
 sharing of all intrastate WATS systems.  National Asso. of Regulatory Utility
 Comm'rs v FCC (1984, App DC) 241 US App DC 175, 746 F2d 1492.
    FCC exceeded its authority under Federal Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151
 et seq.) by adopting policy of extending preferential treatment to female
 applicants for FM radio stations in comparative evaluation proceedings, since
 Commission has been unable to offer any evidence other than statistical
 underrepresentation to support assertion that more woman station owners would
 increase programming diversity.  Steele v FCC (1985, App DC) 248 US App DC 279,
 770 F2d 1192.
    FCC order preempting order of public utility commission of Texas that had
 prohibited Southwestern Bell Telephone Company from providing customer with
 additional interconnections to public switched telephone network did not exceed
 authority delegated to FCC or improperly interfere with state's right to
 establish carrier franchise boundaries within state.  Public Utility Com. v FCC
 (1989, App DC) 281 US App DC 25, 886 F2d 1325.
    Commission lacks jurisdiction over challenge to rates for intrastate Centrex
 service, notwithstanding argument that Centrex can be used to originate and
 terminate interstate communications.  Re North American Telecommunications Asso.
 v Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. & Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., FCC 86-304
 (Adopted June 25, 1986).
 
16. --Cable television systems
    It is not an abuse of discretion for the FCC to base a decision, prohibiting
 telephone companies from controlling or owning CATV systems, on antitrust
 considerations.  General Tel Co. v United States (1971, CA5) 449 F2d 846
 (criticized in Gulf Power Co. v United States (1998, ND Fla) 998 F Supp 1386).
    Jurisdiction over pay cable television rate is reasonably ancillary to
 effective performance of Federal Communications Commissions various
 responsibilities for regulation of television broadcasting.  Brookhaven Cable
 TV, Inc. v Kelly (1978, CA2 NY) 573 F2d 765, 3 Media L R 2226, cert den (1979)
 441 US 904, 60 L Ed 2d 372, 99 S Ct 1991, 4 Media L R 2535.
    Under 47 USCS § 151, Commission is not mandated to promulgate anti-siphoning
 rules for pay cable television, even though such television service will not be
 able to provide nationwide communication service.  Home Box Office, Inc. v FCC
 (1977, App DC) 185 US App DC 142, 567 F2d 9, 2 Media L R 1561, cert den (1977)
 434 US 829, 54 L Ed 2d 89, 98 S Ct 111, 3 Media L R 1128, reh den (1977) 434 US
 988, 54 L Ed 2d 484, 98 S Ct 621.
    FCC's failure to explain its decision to decline review of disputes over
 franchise fees imposed before enactment of 47 USCS § 542 was unreasonable and
 necessitated remand of issue to FCC.  Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v FCC
 (1986, App DC) 254 US App DC 28, 794 F2d 737.
    State has no authority to indirectly regulate Multipoint Distribution Service
 stations; state action making master antenna television systems carrying
 programs transmitted by federally licensed Multipoint Distribution Service
 stations subject to cable franchising requirements intended to eliminate or
 curtail Multipoint Distribution Service as competitor of pay cable offered by
 conventional cable television systems is impermissible interference with
 jurisdiction of Federal Communications Commission.  In Matter of Orth-O-Vision,
 Inc. (1978) 69 FCC2d 657.
 
17. --Data processing services
    Regulations promulgated by Commission providing that no common carrier
 subject to Act shall furnish data processing services to others except through
 separate corporate entity which must maintain its own books of account, have
 separate officers, etc. were valid and supported by rational considerations, but
 regulations precluding common carriers from purchasing, leasing or otherwise
 obtaining data processing service or services from their separate corporations
 and prohibiting carrier from permitting separate corporation to employ its name,
 words or symbols contained in name of carrier, or from using carrier's name in
 separate corporation's promotional enterprise were not within Commission's
 authority.  GTE Service Corp. v FCC (1973, CA2) 474 F2d 724, 1973-1 CCH Trade
 Cases P 74568.
    Notwithstanding absence of explicit reference in statute, expansive power of
 Commission in electronic communications field includes jurisdictional authority
 to regulate and promulgate rules with respect to entrance of communications
 common carriers into nonregulated field of data processing services.  GTE
 Service Corp. v FCC (1973, CA2) 474 F2d 724, 1973-1 CCH Trade Cases P 74568.
 
18. --Program content
    Federal Communications Commission has power and duty, either by general rule
 or by individual decisions, to enforce 18 USC § 1304, which prohibits
 broadcasting of any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes
 dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance.  FCC v American Broadcasting
 Co. (1954) 347 US 284, 98 L Ed 699, 74 S Ct 593, reh den (1954) 347 US 965, 98 L
 Ed 1107, 74 S Ct 773.
    Right to free exercise of programming discretion is, for private licensees,
 not only statutorily conferred but also constitutionally protected.  Muir v
 Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n (1982, CA5 Ala) 688 F2d 1033, 8 Media L R 2305,
 66 ALR Fed 585, cert den (1983) 460 US 1023, 75 L Ed 2d 495, 103 S Ct 1274.
    Section 1 of Communications Act of 1934, 47 USCS § 151, did not, by itself,
 confer authority on Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to promulgate
 regulations that would require television broadcasters to provide video
 description; regulations clearly regulated content and without specific
 authorization from Congress, FCC could not issue such regulations. Motion
 Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v FCC (2002, App DC) 309 F3d 796.
    Television viewer's state-law claim for negligent infliction of serious
 emotional distress is dismissed on preemption grounds, where he contends he
 became violently ill and had to consult psychologist after seeing Rwandan woman
 hacked to death and decapitated by 2 men on news broadcast, because images shown
 on television programs are not matter subject to resolution via state-law tort
 suits but, instead, by FCC pursuant to its enabling statute, Federal
 Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) and administrative regulations
 promulgated thereunder. Dicks v Capital Cities/ABC (1996, SD Ohio) 933 F Supp
 694.
    Mandate of 47 USCS § 151 does not empower commission to render decision on
 complaint of excess violence on television.  Re Polite Soc., (1975) 55 FCC2d
 810.
 
19. Enforcement powers
    Enforcement of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq. rests in federal communications
 commission and not in district courts, save for right of review of commission's
 orders under § 402(a).  McIntire v Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co. (1945, CA3 Pa) 151
 F2d 597, cert den (1946) 327 US 779, 90 L Ed 1007, 66 S Ct 530.
    The FCC may pierce the structural veil of an agency and impute the agency's
 activities to a regulated common carrier, where required for the public good,
 and affiliated CATV groups may be reached through the parent organization.
 General Tel Co. v United States (1971, CA5) 449 F2d 846 (criticized in Gulf
 Power Co. v United States (1998, ND Fla) 998 F Supp 1386).
    Commission is proper forum to institute and prosecute proceedings concerning
 alleged violations of 47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.  Nelson v Leighton (1949, DC NY) 82
 F Supp 661.
    Consumers of long distance telephone services cannot bring actions against
 providers of such services under either federal common law or Racketeer
 Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 USCS §§ 1961 et seq.) arising out
 of alleged improper conduct of defendants in charging consumers for long
 distance calls which were never completed, and with failing to advise consumers
 of such practice, since central issue is whether defendants' conduct is
 "reasonable" under federal Communications Act (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.), and
 since FCC must first make this determination before any liability on part of
 defendants can be established.  In re Long Distance Telecommunication Litig.
 (1985, ED Mich) 612 F Supp 892, affd in part and vacated in part on other
 grounds, revd in part on other grounds, remanded (1987, CA6 Mich) 831 F2d 627.
 
20. --Antitrust considerations
    While Federal Communications Commission does not have power to enforce
 antitrust laws as such, it is permitted to take antitrust policies into account
 in making licensing decisions pursuant to "public interest" standard of Federal
 Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.) governing broadcasters.  FCC
 v National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (1978) 436 US 775, 56 L Ed 2d
 697, 98 S Ct 2096, 3 Media L R 2409.