Document ID: A:\TRINITY.TXT TRINITY METHODIST CHURCH, SOUTH, v. FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION (LYON, Intervener) No. 5561 Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 62 F.2d 850; 61 App. D.C. 311 Argued May 3, 1932 and May 4, 1932 November 28, 1932, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the Federal Radio Commission. OPINIONBY: GRONER OPINION: [*850] Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, GRONER, Associate Justice. Appellant, Trinity Methodist Church, South, was the lessee and operator of a radio-broa hat, though in the name of the church, the station was in fact owned by the Reverend Docto . In September, 1930, appellant filed an application for renewal of station license. Num et the application down for hearing before an examiner. In January, 1931, the matter was nt requested. This was had before the Commission, sitting in banc, and, upon consideratio ce, and/or necessity would not be served by the granting of the application. Some of the Dr. Shuler were sensational rather than instructive; and that in two instances Shuler had This court denied a motion for a stay order, and this appeal was taken. The basis of t without due process of law. It is further insisted that the decision violates the Radio We have been at great pains to examine carefully the record of a thousand pages, and ha We need not stop to review the cases construing the depth and breadth of the first amen wal of the licensing act in the reign of William the Third, and the Letters of Junius. It immunity of censorship, leaving to correction by subsequent punishment those utterances o e, or judicial action, and that the constitutional guaranty should be given liberal and co he right to utter or publish his sentiments, though, of course, upon condition that he is what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of ot mean that the government, through agencies established by Congress, may not refuse a re lication of the regulatory power of Congress in a field within the scope of its legislativ Section 1 of the Radio Act of 1927 (44 Stat. 1162, title 47, USCA, @ 81) specifically d and possessions; to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of in federal authority set up by the act to carry out its terms is the Federal Radio Commission public interest, convenience, or necessity" will be served by the granting thereof, and an We have already held that radio communication, in the sense contemplated by the act, co 630, and in this respect we are supported by many decisions of the Supreme Court, Pensaco L.R.A. (N.S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 n the transmitting and the receiving apparatus, the broadcasting of programs across state rcised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitation, other than such as prescribed supra, "keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new devel In recent years the power under the commerce clause has been extended to legislation ag d foods, Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364; in , 905; and in a variety of other subjects never contemplated by the framers of the Constit which it deems inimical to the public welfare or contrary to the public interest. Lotter ions, or, perhaps, it would be more nearly correct to say, recognized the inevitable neces n of the science with its limited facilities, the regulatory provisions of the Radio Act a s under the Fourteenth Amendment. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448, 449, 10 S. Ct. 93 e is a reasonable exercise of governmental control for the public good. In the case under consideration, the evidence abundantly sustains the conclusion of the to the Supreme Court of California, that court said (In re Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 P. 4 pect to certain causes then pending or on trial, and amounted to contempt of court. Appel , charging it with ulterior and sinister purposes. With no more justification, he charged egging and gambling joint. In none of these matters, when called on to explain or justify damaging information against a prominent unnamed man which, unless a contribution (presum " and prostitutes. He alluded slightingly to the Jews as a race, and made frequent and bit sincere in denouncing conditions he did not approve, it is manifest, we think, that it is since that is the test the Commission is required to apply, we think it was its duty in co neither arbitrary nor capricious. If it be considered that one in possession of a permit to broadcast in interstate comme the administration of justice, offend the religious susceptibilities of thousands, inspire the instance of the one offended, then this great science, instead of a boon, will become t, nor is it a whittling away of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, or an impai religious practices of which he does not approve. He may even indulge private malice or rumentality of commerce for such purposes, or any other, except in subordination to all re Nor are we any more impressed with the argument that the refusal to renew a license is 0 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322, 28 A.L.R. 1321, and the denial of a permit to us missive, and, as was said by the Supreme Court in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 for the public good, then there is no taking of property for the public use, and a right gislative authority and a taking of property without compensation is alleged, the test is ensated obedience" to such regulation "is not an unconstitutional taking of property witho A case which illustrates this principle is Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 23 ied for and obtained permission from the state to build a wharf from its upland into the r avigation, adopted the lines of navigability formerly established by the state of Virginia which the riparian proprietor's wharf extended some two hundred feet within the new lines eceived a grant of privilege from the state of Virginia prior to the exercise by the gover property, and the privilege so granted irrevocable, and that it could be taken for public is conclusive, and its judgment and determination the exercise of a legislative power in r improvement in the Ohio river diminished greatly the value of the riparian owner's propert uired to remodel the same as an obstruction to navigation, though erected under authority rule was applied in the case of a bridge erected expressly pursuant to an act of Congress. r power of a riparian owner was upheld; and in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. bitably show adherence to the principle that one who applies for and obtains a grant or pe such grant or right subject to the exercise of the power of government, in the public int Appellant was duly notified by the Commission of the hearing which it ordered to be hel rtunity extended to furnish proof to establish the right under the provisions of the act f as in all respects right, and should be, and is, affirmed. Affirmed. VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice, concurs in the result.